| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: don't set EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT when splitting before submitting I/O
When allocating blocks during within-EOF DIO and writeback with
dioread_nolock enabled, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO was set to split an
existing large unwritten extent. However, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT was
set when calling ext4_split_convert_extents(), which may potentially
result in stale data issues.
Assume we have an unwritten extent, and then DIO writes the second half.
[UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU] on-disk extent U: unwritten extent
[UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU] extent status tree
|<- ->| ----> dio write this range
First, ext4_iomap_alloc() call ext4_map_blocks() with
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT and
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE flags set. ext4_map_blocks() find this extent and
call ext4_split_convert_extents() with EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT and the
above flags set.
Then, ext4_split_convert_extents() calls ext4_split_extent() with
EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT, EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2 and EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2
flags set, and it calls ext4_split_extent_at() to split the second half
with EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2, EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT1, EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT
and EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2 flags set. However, ext4_split_extent_at()
failed to insert extent since a temporary lack -ENOSPC. It zeroes out
the first half but convert the entire on-disk extent to written since
the EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2 flag set, but left the second half as unwritten
in the extent status tree.
[0000000000SSSSSS] data S: stale data, 0: zeroed
[WWWWWWWWWWWWWWWW] on-disk extent W: written extent
[WWWWWWWWWWUUUUUU] extent status tree
Finally, if the DIO failed to write data to the disk, the stale data in
the second half will be exposed once the cached extent entry is gone.
Fix this issue by not passing EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT when splitting
an unwritten extent before submitting I/O, and make
ext4_split_convert_extents() to zero out the entire extent range
to zero for this case, and also mark the extent in the extent status
tree for consistency. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: caiaq: Fix potentially leftover ep1_in_urb at error path
The previous fix for handling the error from setup_card() missed that
an internal URB cdev->ep1_in_urb might have been already submitted
beforehand. In the normal case, this URB gets killed at the
disconnection, but in the error path, we didn't do it, hence there can
be a potential leak.
Fix it in the error path for setup_card(), too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix potential UAF after skb_unshare() failure
If skb_unshare() fails to unshare a packet due to allocation failure in
rxrpc_input_packet(), the skb pointer in the parent (rxrpc_io_thread())
will be NULL'd out. This will likely cause the call to
trace_rxrpc_rx_done() to oops.
Fix this by moving the unsharing down to where rxrpc_input_call_event()
calls rxrpc_input_call_packet(). There are a number of places prior to
that where we ignore DATA packets for a variety of reasons (such as the
call already being complete) for which an unshare is then avoided.
And with that, rxrpc_input_packet() doesn't need to take a pointer to the
pointer to the packet, so change that to just a pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thermal: core: Fix thermal zone governor cleanup issues
If thermal_zone_device_register_with_trips() fails after adding
a thermal governor to the thermal zone being registered, the
governor is not removed from it as appropriate which may lead to
a memory leak.
In turn, thermal_zone_device_unregister() calls thermal_set_governor()
without acquiring the thermal zone lock beforehand which may race with
a governor update via sysfs and may lead to a use-after-free in that
case.
Address these issues by adding two thermal_set_governor() calls, one to
thermal_release() to remove the governor from the given thermal zone,
and one to the thermal zone registration error path to cover failures
preceding the thermal zone device registration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Prevent potential null-ptr-deref in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
If a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY contains a zero value for both
protocol and result, this is currently not treated as an error. In case
of ac->negotiating == true and ac->protocol > 0, this leads to setting
ac->protocol = 0 and ac->ops = NULL. Thereafter, the check for
ac->protocol != protocol returns false, and init_protocol() is not
called. Subsequently, ac->ops->handle_reply() is called, which leads to
a null pointer dereference, because ac->ops is still NULL.
This patch changes the check for ac->protocol != protocol to
!ac->protocol, as this also includes the case when the protocol was set
to zero in the message. This causes the message to be treated as
containing a bad auth protocol. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: algif_aead - snapshot IV for async AEAD requests
AF_ALG AEAD AIO requests currently use the socket-wide IV buffer during
request processing. For async requests, later socket activity can
update that shared state before the original request has fully
completed, which can lead to inconsistent IV handling.
Snapshot the IV into per-request storage when preparing the AEAD
request, so in-flight operations no longer depend on mutable socket
state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/slab: return NULL early from kmalloc_nolock() in NMI on UP
On UP kernels (!CONFIG_SMP), spin_trylock() is a no-op that
unconditionally succeeds even when the lock is already held. As a
result, kmalloc_nolock() called from NMI context can re-enter the slab
allocator and acquire n->list_lock that the interrupted context is
already holding, corrupting slab state.
With CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK on UP, the following BUG is triggered with
the slub_kunit test module:
BUG: spinlock trylock failure on UP on CPU#0, kunit_try_catch/243
[...]
Call Trace:
<NMI>
dump_stack_lvl+0x3f/0x60
do_raw_spin_trylock+0x41/0x50
_raw_spin_trylock+0x24/0x50
get_from_partial_node+0x120/0x4d0
___slab_alloc+0x8a/0x4c0
kmalloc_nolock_noprof+0x164/0x310
[...]
</NMI>
Fix this by returning NULL early when invoked from NMI on a UP kernel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/cdx: Serialize VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS with a per-device mutex
vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger() reads vdev->config_msi and operates on the
vdev->cdx_irqs array based on its value, but provides no serialization
against concurrent VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctls. Two callers can race
such that one observes config_msi as set while another clears it and
frees cdx_irqs via vfio_cdx_msi_disable(), resulting in a use-after-free
of the cdx_irqs array.
Add a cdx_irqs_lock mutex to struct vfio_cdx_device and acquire it in
vfio_cdx_set_msi_trigger(), which is the single chokepoint through
which all updates to config_msi, cdx_irqs, and msi_count flow, covering
both the ioctl path and the close-device cleanup path. This keeps the
test of config_msi atomic with the subsequent enable, disable, or
trigger operations.
Drop the pre-call !cdx_irqs test from vfio_cdx_irqs_cleanup() as part
of this change: the optimization it provided is redundant with the
!config_msi early-return inside vfio_cdx_msi_disable(), and leaving the
test in place would be an unsynchronized read of state the new lock is
meant to protect. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks
The existing SELinux security model for overlayfs is to allow access if
the current task is able to access the top level file (the "user" file)
and the mounter's credentials are sufficient to access the lower
level file (the "backing" file). Unfortunately, the current code does
not properly enforce these access controls for both mmap() and mprotect()
operations on overlayfs filesystems.
This patch makes use of the newly created security_mmap_backing_file()
LSM hook to provide the missing backing file enforcement for mmap()
operations, and leverages the backing file API and new LSM blob to
provide the necessary information to properly enforce the mprotect()
access controls. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jbd2: fix deadlock in jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke()
Commit f76d4c28a46a ("fs/jbd2: use sleeping version of
__find_get_block()") changed jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke() to use
__find_get_block_nonatomic() which holds the folio lock instead of
i_private_lock. This breaks the lock ordering (folio -> buffer) and
causes an ABBA deadlock when the filesystem blocksize < pagesize:
T1 T2
ext4_mkdir()
ext4_init_new_dir()
ext4_append()
ext4_getblk()
lock_buffer() <- A
sync_blockdev()
blkdev_writepages()
writeback_iter()
writeback_get_folio()
folio_lock() <- B
ext4_journal_get_create_access()
jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke()
__find_get_block_nonatomic()
folio_lock() <- B
block_write_full_folio()
lock_buffer() <- A
This can occasionally cause generic/013 to hang.
Fix by only calling __find_get_block_nonatomic() when the passed
buffer_head doesn't belong to the bdev, which is the only case that we
need to look up its bdev alias. Otherwise, the lookup is redundant since
the found buffer_head is equal to the one we passed in. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message()
The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to
compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from
user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8,
data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size.
A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing
memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into
adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor
over MMIO.
Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields
claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose
own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause
the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning
failure.
Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking
an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware
frame from the controller's free pool, and returning without a
corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it.
Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the
memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame,
consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size()
for the header field. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: defio: Disconnect deferred I/O from the lifetime of struct fb_info
Hold state of deferred I/O in struct fb_deferred_io_state. Allocate an
instance as part of initializing deferred I/O and remove it only after
the final mapping has been closed. If the fb_info and the contained
deferred I/O meanwhile goes away, clear struct fb_deferred_io_state.info
to invalidate the mapping. Any access will then result in a SIGBUS
signal.
Fixes a long-standing problem, where a device hot-unplug happens while
user space still has an active mapping of the graphics memory. The hot-
unplug frees the instance of struct fb_info. Accessing the memory will
operate on undefined state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix rxkad crypto unalignment handling
Fix handling of a packet with a misaligned crypto length. Also handle
non-ENOMEM errors from decryption by aborting. Further, remove the
WARN_ON_ONCE() so that it can't be remotely triggered (a trace line can
still be emitted). |
| A flaw was found in Keycloak's Fine-Grained Admin Permissions (FGAPv2) feature. An administrator with limited client management permissions can exploit this vulnerability to assign any realm role, including highly privileged roles, to a client's scope mapping. This bypasses intended security controls, allowing the injected role to be projected into a user's authentication token when they access the modified client. This could lead to unauthorized privilege escalation within the Keycloak realm. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/exynos: vidi: use priv->vidi_dev for ctx lookup in vidi_connection_ioctl()
vidi_connection_ioctl() retrieves the driver_data from drm_dev->dev to
obtain a struct vidi_context pointer. However, drm_dev->dev is the
exynos-drm master device, and the driver_data contained therein is not
the vidi component device, but a completely different device.
This can lead to various bugs, ranging from null pointer dereferences and
garbage value accesses to, in unlucky cases, out-of-bounds errors,
use-after-free errors, and more.
To resolve this issue, we need to store/delete the vidi device pointer in
exynos_drm_private->vidi_dev during bind/unbind, and then read this
exynos_drm_private->vidi_dev within ioctl() to obtain the correct
struct vidi_context pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Return proper address for non-zero offsets in insn array
The map_direct_value_addr() function of the instruction
array map incorrectly adds offset to the resulting address.
This is a bug, because later the resolve_pseudo_ldimm64()
function adds the offset. Fix it. Corresponding selftests
are added in a consequent commit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Limit bpf program signature size
Practical BPF signatures are significantly smaller than
KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE
Allowing larger sizes opens the door for abuse by passing excessive
size values and forcing the kernel into expensive allocation paths (via
kmalloc_large or vmalloc). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix UMR hang in LAG error state unload
During firmware reset in LAG mode, a race condition causes the driver
to hang indefinitely while waiting for UMR completion during device
unload. See [1].
In LAG mode the bond device is only registered on the master, so it
never sees sys_error events from the slave.
During firmware reset this causes UMR waits to hang forever on unload
as the slave is dead but the master hasn't entered error state yet, so
UMR posts succeed but completions never arrive.
Fix this by adding a sys_error notifier that gets registered before
MLX5_IB_STAGE_IB_REG and stays alive until after ib_unregister_device().
This ensures error events reach the bond device throughout teardown.
[1]
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x2bd/0x760
schedule+0x37/0xa0
schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10
__mutex_lock.isra.6+0x2b5/0x4a0
__mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x606/0x870 [mlx5_ib]
? __xa_erase+0x4a/0xa0
? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30
? wait_for_completion+0x31/0x100
ib_dereg_mr_user+0x48/0xc0 [ib_core]
? rdmacg_uncharge_hierarchy+0xa0/0x100
destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x20/0x50 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x37/0x150 [ib_uverbs]
__uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0xda/0x140 [ib_uverbs]
uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x3a/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
ib_uverbs_remove_one+0xc3/0x140 [ib_uverbs]
remove_client_context+0x8b/0xd0 [ib_core]
disable_device+0x8c/0x130 [ib_core]
__ib_unregister_device+0x10d/0x180 [ib_core]
ib_unregister_device+0x21/0x30 [ib_core]
__mlx5_ib_remove+0x1e4/0x1f0 [mlx5_ib]
auxiliary_bus_remove+0x1e/0x30
device_release_driver_internal+0x103/0x1f0
bus_remove_device+0xf7/0x170
device_del+0x181/0x410
mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked.part.10+0xa9/0x1d0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_disable_lag+0x253/0x260 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_lag_disable_change+0x89/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_eswitch_disable+0x67/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_unload+0x15/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_unload_one+0x71/0xc0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_sync_reset_reload_work+0x83/0x100 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360
worker_thread+0x30/0x390
? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
kthread+0x116/0x130
? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix invalid leaf access in btrfs_quota_enable() if ref key not found
If btrfs_search_slot_for_read() returns 1, it means we did not find any
key greater than or equals to the key we asked for, meaning we have
reached the end of the tree and therefore the path is not valid. If
this happens we need to break out of the loop and stop, instead of
continuing and accessing an invalid path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: Stop job scheduling across aie2_release_resource()
Running jobs on a hardware context while it is in the process of
releasing resources can lead to use-after-free and crashes.
Fix this by stopping job scheduling before calling
aie2_release_resource() and restarting it after the release completes.
Additionally, aie2_sched_job_run() now checks whether the hardware
context is still active. |
