| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix missing key size check for L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ
This adds a check for encryption key size upon receiving
L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ which is required by L2CAP/LE/CFC/BV-15-C which
expects L2CAP_CR_LE_BAD_KEY_SIZE. |
| Use after free in Views in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.96 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: xscale: Check for PTP support properly
In ixp4xx_get_ts_info() ixp46x_ptp_find() is called
unconditionally despite this feature only existing on
ixp46x, leading to the following splat from tcpdump:
root@OpenWrt:~# tcpdump -vv -X -i eth0
(...)
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000238 when read
(...)
Call trace:
ptp_clock_index from ixp46x_ptp_find+0x1c/0x38
ixp46x_ptp_find from ixp4xx_get_ts_info+0x4c/0x64
ixp4xx_get_ts_info from __ethtool_get_ts_info+0x90/0x108
__ethtool_get_ts_info from __dev_ethtool+0xa00/0x2648
__dev_ethtool from dev_ethtool+0x160/0x234
dev_ethtool from dev_ioctl+0x2cc/0x460
dev_ioctl from sock_ioctl+0x1ec/0x524
sock_ioctl from sys_ioctl+0x51c/0xa94
sys_ioctl from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x44
(...)
Segmentation fault
Check for ixp46x in ixp46x_ptp_find() before trying to set up
PTP to avoid this.
To avoid altering the returned error code from ixp4xx_hwtstamp_set()
which before this patch was -EOPNOTSUPP, we return -EOPNOTSUPP
from ixp4xx_hwtstamp_set() if ixp46x_ptp_find() fails no matter
the error code. The helper function ixp46x_ptp_find() helper
returns -ENODEV. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/zcrx: fix post open error handling
Closing a queue doesn't guarantee that all associated page pools are
terminated right away, let the refcounting do the work instead of
releasing the zcrx ctx directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: rs9: Reserve 8 struct clk_hw slots for for 9FGV0841
The 9FGV0841 has 8 outputs and registers 8 struct clk_hw, make sure
there are 8 slots for those newly registered clk_hw pointers, else
there is going to be out of bounds write when pointers 4..7 are set
into struct rs9_driver_data .clk_dif[4..7] field.
Since there are other structure members past this struct clk_hw
pointer array, writing to .clk_dif[4..7] fields corrupts both
the struct rs9_driver_data content and data around it, sometimes
without crashing the kernel. However, the kernel does surely
crash when the driver is unbound or during suspend.
Fix this, increase the struct clk_hw pointer array size to the
maximum output count of 9FGV0841, which is the biggest chip that
is supported by this driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: pci: validate release report content before using for RTL8922DE
The commit 957eda596c76
("wifi: rtw89: pci: validate sequence number of TX release report")
does validation on existing chips, which somehow a release report of SKB
becomes malformed. As no clear cause found, add rules ahead for RTL8922DE
to avoid crash if it happens. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
procfs: fix possible double mmput() in do_procmap_query()
When user provides incorrectly sized buffer for build ID for PROCMAP_QUERY
we return with -ENAMETOOLONG error. After recent changes this condition
happens later, after we unlocked mmap_lock/per-VMA lock and did mmput(),
so original goto out is now wrong and will double-mmput() mm_struct. Fix
by jumping further to clean up only vm_file and name_buf. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: fix incorrect early exits for invalid metabox-enabled images
Crafted EROFS images with metadata compression enabled can trigger
incorrect early returns, leading to folio reference leaks.
However, this does not cause system crashes or other severe issues. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (tps53679) Fix array access with zero-length block read
i2c_smbus_read_block_data() can return 0, indicating a zero-length
read. When this happens, tps53679_identify_chip() accesses buf[ret - 1]
which is buf[-1], reading one byte before the buffer on the stack.
Fix by changing the check from "ret < 0" to "ret <= 0", treating a
zero-length read as an error (-EIO), which prevents the out-of-bounds
array access.
Also fix a typo in the adjacent comment: "if present" instead of
duplicate "if". |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: cpsw_new: Fix potential unregister of netdev that has not been registered yet
If an error occurs during register_netdev() for the first MAC in
cpsw_register_ports(), even though cpsw->slaves[0].ndev is set to NULL,
cpsw->slaves[1].ndev would remain unchanged. This could later cause
cpsw_unregister_ports() to attempt unregistering the second MAC.
To address this, add a check for ndev->reg_state before calling
unregister_netdev(). With this change, setting cpsw->slaves[i].ndev
to NULL becomes unnecessary and can be removed accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi: ipmb: initialise event handler read bytes
IPMB doesn't use i2c reads, but the handler needs to set a value.
Otherwise an i2c read will return an uninitialised value from the bus
driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix double brelse() the buffer of the extents path
In ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up(), set path[1].p_bh to NULL after it has been
released, otherwise it may be released twice. An example of what triggers
this is as follows:
split2 map split1
|--------|-------|--------|
ext4_ext_map_blocks
ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents
ext4_split_convert_extents
// path->p_depth == 0
ext4_split_extent
// 1. do split1
ext4_split_extent_at
|ext4_ext_insert_extent
| ext4_ext_create_new_leaf
| ext4_ext_grow_indepth
| le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1)
| ext4_find_extent
| // return -ENOMEM
|// get error and try zeroout
|path = ext4_find_extent
| path->p_depth = 1
|ext4_ext_try_to_merge
| ext4_ext_try_to_merge_up
| path->p_depth = 0
| brelse(path[1].p_bh) ---> not set to NULL here
|// zeroout success
// 2. update path
ext4_find_extent
// 3. do split2
ext4_split_extent_at
ext4_ext_insert_extent
ext4_ext_create_new_leaf
ext4_ext_grow_indepth
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1)
ext4_find_extent
path[0].p_bh = NULL;
path->p_depth = 1
read_extent_tree_block ---> return err
// path[1].p_bh is still the old value
ext4_free_ext_path
ext4_ext_drop_refs
// path->p_depth == 1
brelse(path[1].p_bh) ---> brelse a buffer twice
Finally got the following WARRNING when removing the buffer from lru:
============================================
VFS: brelse: Trying to free free buffer
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 72 at fs/buffer.c:1241 __brelse+0x58/0x90
CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: kworker/u19:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-dirty #716
RIP: 0010:__brelse+0x58/0x90
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__find_get_block+0x6e7/0x810
bdev_getblk+0x2b/0x480
__ext4_get_inode_loc+0x48a/0x1240
ext4_get_inode_loc+0xb2/0x150
ext4_reserve_inode_write+0xb7/0x230
__ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x144/0x6a0
ext4_ext_insert_extent+0x9c8/0x3230
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xf45/0x2dc0
ext4_map_blocks+0x724/0x1700
ext4_do_writepages+0x12d6/0x2a70
[...]
============================================ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wan: farsync: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by unfinished tasklets
When the FarSync T-series card is being detached, the fst_card_info is
deallocated in fst_remove_one(). However, the fst_tx_task or fst_int_task
may still be running or pending, leading to use-after-free bugs when the
already freed fst_card_info is accessed in fst_process_tx_work_q() or
fst_process_int_work_q().
A typical race condition is depicted below:
CPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (tasklet)
| fst_start_xmit()
fst_remove_one() | tasklet_schedule()
unregister_hdlc_device()|
| fst_process_tx_work_q() //handler
kfree(card) //free | do_bottom_half_tx()
| card-> //use
The following KASAN trace was captured:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800aad101c by task ksoftirqd/3/32
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
print_report+0xcb/0x5d0
? do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
? do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00
do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x85/0xe0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___hrtimer_run_queues+0x10/0x10
fst_process_tx_work_q+0x67/0x90
tasklet_action_common+0x1fa/0x720
? hrtimer_interrupt+0x31f/0x780
handle_softirqs+0x176/0x530
__irq_exit_rcu+0xab/0xe0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80
...
Allocated by task 41 on cpu 3 at 72.330843s:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
fst_add_one+0x1a5/0x1cd0
local_pci_probe+0xdd/0x190
pci_device_probe+0x341/0x480
really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0
__driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210
__device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320
bus_for_each_drv+0x101/0x190
__device_attach+0x198/0x3a0
device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0
pci_bus_add_device+0x81/0xc0
pci_bus_add_devices+0x7e/0x190
enable_slot+0x9b9/0x1130
acpiphp_check_bridge.part.0+0x2e1/0x460
acpiphp_hotplug_notify+0x36c/0x3c0
acpi_device_hotplug+0x203/0xb10
acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x59/0x80
...
Freed by task 41 on cpu 1 at 75.138639s:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
kfree+0x135/0x410
fst_remove_one+0x2ca/0x540
pci_device_remove+0xa6/0x1d0
device_release_driver_internal+0x364/0x530
pci_stop_bus_device+0x105/0x150
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xd/0x20
disable_slot+0x116/0x260
acpiphp_disable_and_eject_slot+0x4b/0x190
acpiphp_hotplug_notify+0x230/0x3c0
acpi_device_hotplug+0x203/0xb10
acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x59/0x80
...
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800aad1000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of
freed 1024-byte region
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xaad0
head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0x100000000000040(head|node=0|zone=1)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0100000000000040 ffff888007042dc0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0100000000000040 ffff888007042dc0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0100000000000003 ffffea00002ab401 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88800aad0f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88800aad0f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88800aad1000: fa fb
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which
doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called
personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for
RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX,
bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux.
So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the
remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it
potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by
SELinux.
The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via
AIO and can be found in [1].
The PoC:
$ cat > test.c
int main(void) {
size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0);
const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0);
unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff);
syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old);
syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0);
syscall(SYS_personality, old);
// show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced
int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY);
unsigned char buf2[1024];
while (1) {
int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024);
if (ret <= 0) break;
write(1, buf2, ret);
}
close(fd);
}
$ gcc test.c -o test
$ ./test | grep rwx
7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted)
[PM: subject line tweaks] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware_loader: Block path traversal
Most firmware names are hardcoded strings, or are constructed from fairly
constrained format strings where the dynamic parts are just some hex
numbers or such.
However, there are a couple codepaths in the kernel where firmware file
names contain string components that are passed through from a device or
semi-privileged userspace; the ones I could find (not counting interfaces
that require root privileges) are:
- lpfc_sli4_request_firmware_update() seems to construct the firmware
filename from "ModelName", a string that was previously parsed out of
some descriptor ("Vital Product Data") in lpfc_fill_vpd()
- nfp_net_fw_find() seems to construct a firmware filename from a model
name coming from nfp_hwinfo_lookup(pf->hwinfo, "nffw.partno"), which I
think parses some descriptor that was read from the device.
(But this case likely isn't exploitable because the format string looks
like "netronome/nic_%s", and there shouldn't be any *folders* starting
with "netronome/nic_". The previous case was different because there,
the "%s" is *at the start* of the format string.)
- module_flash_fw_schedule() is reachable from the
ETHTOOL_MSG_MODULE_FW_FLASH_ACT netlink command, which is marked as
GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM (meaning CAP_NET_ADMIN inside a user namespace is
enough to pass the privilege check), and takes a userspace-provided
firmware name.
(But I think to reach this case, you need to have CAP_NET_ADMIN over a
network namespace that a special kind of ethernet device is mapped into,
so I think this is not a viable attack path in practice.)
Fix it by rejecting any firmware names containing ".." path components.
For what it's worth, I went looking and haven't found any USB device
drivers that use the firmware loader dangerously. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
team: avoid NETDEV_CHANGEMTU event when unregistering slave
syzbot is reporting
unregister_netdevice: waiting for netdevsim0 to become free. Usage count = 3
ref_tracker: netdev@ffff88807dcf8618 has 1/2 users at
__netdev_tracker_alloc include/linux/netdevice.h:4400 [inline]
netdev_hold include/linux/netdevice.h:4429 [inline]
inetdev_init+0x201/0x4e0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:286
inetdev_event+0x251/0x1610 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1600
notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_mtu net/core/dev.c:2318 [inline]
netif_set_mtu_ext+0x5aa/0x800 net/core/dev.c:9886
netif_set_mtu+0xd7/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:9907
dev_set_mtu+0x126/0x260 net/core/dev_api.c:248
team_port_del+0xb07/0xcb0 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1333
team_del_slave drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1936 [inline]
team_device_event+0x207/0x5b0 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2929
notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2281 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2295 [inline]
__dev_change_net_namespace+0xcb7/0x2050 net/core/dev.c:12592
do_setlink+0x2ce/0x4590 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3060
rtnl_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3776 [inline]
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3935 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x15a9/0x1be0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4072
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7d5/0xbe0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958
netlink_rcv_skb+0x232/0x4b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x80f/0x9b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344
netlink_sendmsg+0x813/0xb40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894
problem. Ido Schimmel found steps to reproduce
ip link add name team1 type team
ip link add name dummy1 mtu 1499 master team1 type dummy
ip netns add ns1
ip link set dev dummy1 netns ns1
ip -n ns1 link del dev dummy1
and also found that the same issue was fixed in the bond driver in
commit f51048c3e07b ("bonding: avoid NETDEV_CHANGEMTU event when
unregistering slave").
Let's do similar thing for the team driver, with commit ad7c7b2172c3 ("net:
hold netdev instance lock during sysfs operations") and commit 303a8487a657
("net: s/__dev_set_mtu/__netif_set_mtu/") also applied. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: iris: Add missing platform data entries for SM8750
Two platform-data fields for SM8750 were missed:
- get_vpu_buffer_size = iris_vpu33_buf_size
Without this, the driver fails to allocate the required internal
buffers, leading to basic decode/encode failures during session
bring-up.
- max_core_mbps = ((7680 * 4320) / 256) * 60
Without this capability exposed, capability checks are incomplete and
v4l2-compliance for encoder fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/atmel-hlcdc: fix use-after-free of drm_crtc_commit after release
The atmel_hlcdc_plane_atomic_duplicate_state() callback was copying
the atmel_hlcdc_plane state structure without properly duplicating the
drm_plane_state. In particular, state->commit remained set to the old
state commit, which can lead to a use-after-free in the next
drm_atomic_commit() call.
Fix this by calling
__drm_atomic_helper_duplicate_plane_state(), which correctly clones
the base drm_plane_state (including the ->commit pointer).
It has been seen when closing and re-opening the device node while
another DRM client (e.g. fbdev) is still attached:
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-64 (Not tainted): Poison overwritten
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
0xc611b344-0xc611b344 @offset=836. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b
FIX kmalloc-64: Restoring Poison 0xc611b344-0xc611b344=0x6b
Allocated in drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x1e8/0x7bc age=178 cpu=0
pid=29
drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x1e8/0x7bc
drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x3c/0x15c
drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xf4
drm_framebuffer_remove+0x4cc/0x5a8
drm_mode_rmfb_work_fn+0x6c/0x80
process_one_work+0x12c/0x2cc
worker_thread+0x2a8/0x400
kthread+0xc0/0xdc
ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28
Freed in drm_atomic_helper_commit_hw_done+0x100/0x150 age=8 cpu=0
pid=169
drm_atomic_helper_commit_hw_done+0x100/0x150
drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x64/0x8c
commit_tail+0x168/0x18c
drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x138/0x15c
drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xf4
drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x84/0xb8
drm_mode_setcrtc+0x32c/0x810
drm_ioctl+0x20c/0x488
sys_ioctl+0x14c/0xc20
ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54
Slab 0xef8bc360 objects=21 used=16 fp=0xc611b7c0
flags=0x200(workingset|zone=0)
Object 0xc611b340 @offset=832 fp=0xc611b7c0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_skbedit: fix divide-by-zero in tcf_skbedit_hash()
Commit 38a6f0865796 ("net: sched: support hash selecting tx queue")
added SKBEDIT_F_TXQ_SKBHASH support. The inclusive range size is
computed as:
mapping_mod = queue_mapping_max - queue_mapping + 1;
The range size can be 65536 when the requested range covers all possible
u16 queue IDs (e.g. queue_mapping=0 and queue_mapping_max=U16_MAX).
That value cannot be represented in a u16 and previously wrapped to 0,
so tcf_skbedit_hash() could trigger a divide-by-zero:
queue_mapping += skb_get_hash(skb) % params->mapping_mod;
Compute mapping_mod in a wider type and reject ranges larger than U16_MAX
to prevent params->mapping_mod from becoming 0 and avoid the crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: prevent races in ->query_interfaces()
It was possible for two query interface works to be concurrently trying
to update the interfaces.
Prevent this by checking and updating iface_last_update under
iface_lock. |
