| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/xe: Reorganize the init to decouple migration from reset
Attempting to issue reset on VF devices that don't support migration
leads to the following:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000011f8
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 7443 Comm: xe_sriov_flr Tainted: G S U 7.0.0-rc1-lgci-xe-xe-4588-cec43d5c2696af219-nodebug+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER
Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-P DDR4 RVP, BIOS RPLPFWI1.R00.4035.A00.2301200723 01/20/2023
RIP: 0010:xe_sriov_vfio_wait_flr_done+0xc/0x80 [xe]
Code: ff c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 53 <83> bf f8 11 00 00 02 75 61 41 89 f4 85 f6 74 52 48 8b 47 08 48 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000f7c39b8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffffffffa04d8660 RBX: ffff88813e3e4000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000f7c39c8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888101a48800
R13: ffff88813e3e4150 R14: ffff888130d0d008 R15: ffff88813e3e40d0
FS: 00007877d3d0d940(0000) GS:ffff88890b6d3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000011f8 CR3: 000000015a762000 CR4: 0000000000f52ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
xe_vfio_pci_reset_done+0x49/0x120 [xe_vfio_pci]
pci_dev_restore+0x3b/0x80
pci_reset_function+0x109/0x140
reset_store+0x5c/0xb0
dev_attr_store+0x17/0x40
sysfs_kf_write+0x72/0x90
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x161/0x1f0
vfs_write+0x261/0x440
ksys_write+0x69/0xf0
__x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
x64_sys_call+0x259/0x26e0
do_syscall_64+0xcb/0x1500
? __fput+0x1a2/0x2d0
? fput_close_sync+0x3d/0xa0
? __x64_sys_close+0x3e/0x90
? x64_sys_call+0x1b7c/0x26e0
? do_syscall_64+0x109/0x1500
? __task_pid_nr_ns+0x68/0x100
? __do_sys_getpid+0x1d/0x30
? x64_sys_call+0x10b5/0x26e0
? do_syscall_64+0x109/0x1500
? putname+0x41/0x90
? do_faccessat+0x1e8/0x300
? __x64_sys_access+0x1c/0x30
? x64_sys_call+0x1822/0x26e0
? do_syscall_64+0x109/0x1500
? tick_program_event+0x43/0xa0
? hrtimer_interrupt+0x126/0x260
? irqentry_exit+0xb2/0x710
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7877d5f1c5a4
Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d a5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89
RSP: 002b:00007fff48e5f908 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007877d5f1c5a4
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007877d621b0c9 RDI: 0000000000000009
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00005fb49113b010 R09: 0000000000000007
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007877d621b0c9
R13: 0000000000000009 R14: 00007fff48e5fac0 R15: 00007fff48e5fac0
</TASK>
This is caused by the fact that some of the xe_vfio_pci_core_device
members needed for handling reset are only initialized as part of
migration init.
Fix the problem by reorganizing the code to decouple VF init from
migration init. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Reject attempts to sync VMSA of an already-launched/encrypted vCPU
Reject synchronizing vCPU state to its associated VMSA if the vCPU has
already been launched, i.e. if the VMSA has already been encrypted. On a
host with SNP enabled, accessing guest-private memory generates an RMP #PF
and panics the host.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff1276cbfdf36000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x80000003) - RMP violation
PGD 5a31801067 P4D 5a31802067 PUD 40ccfb5063 PMD 40e5954063 PTE 80000040fdf36163
SEV-SNP: PFN 0x40fdf36, RMP entry: [0x6010fffffffff001 - 0x000000000000001f]
Oops: Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 33 UID: 0 PID: 996180 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G OE
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7625/0H1TJT, BIOS 1.5.8 07/21/2023
RIP: 0010:sev_es_sync_vmsa+0x54/0x4c0 [kvm_amd]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
snp_launch_update_vmsa+0x19d/0x290 [kvm_amd]
snp_launch_finish+0xb6/0x380 [kvm_amd]
sev_mem_enc_ioctl+0x14e/0x720 [kvm_amd]
kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0x837/0xcf0 [kvm]
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x3fd/0xcc0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xa3/0x100
x64_sys_call+0xfe0/0x2350
do_syscall_64+0x81/0x10f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7ffff673287d
</TASK>
Note, the KVM flaw has been present since commit ad73109ae7ec ("KVM: SVM:
Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest"), but has only been
actively dangerous for the host since SNP support was added. With SEV-ES,
KVM would "just" clobber guest state, which is totally fine from a host
kernel perspective since userspace can clobber guest state any time before
sev_launch_update_vmsa(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: qcom: q6apm: move component registration to unmanaged version
q6apm component registers dais dynamically from ASoC toplology, which
are allocated using device managed version apis. Allocating both
component and dynamic dais using managed version could lead to incorrect
free ordering, dai will be freed while component still holding references
to it.
Fix this issue by moving component to unmanged version so
that the dai pointers are only freeded after the component is removed.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in snd_soc_del_component_unlocked+0x3d4/0x400 [snd_soc_core]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff00084493a6e8 by task kworker/u48:0/3426
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: LENOVO 21N2ZC5PUS/21N2ZC5PUS, BIOS N42ET57W (1.31 ) 08/08/2024
Workqueue: pdr_notifier_wq pdr_notifier_work [pdr_interface]
Call trace:
show_stack+0x28/0x7c (C)
dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80
print_report+0x160/0x4b4
kasan_report+0xac/0xfc
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x34
snd_soc_del_component_unlocked+0x3d4/0x400 [snd_soc_core]
snd_soc_unregister_component_by_driver+0x50/0x88 [snd_soc_core]
devm_component_release+0x30/0x5c [snd_soc_core]
devres_release_all+0x13c/0x210
device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x190
device_release_driver_internal+0x350/0x468
device_release_driver+0x18/0x30
bus_remove_device+0x1a0/0x35c
device_del+0x314/0x7f0
device_unregister+0x20/0xbc
apr_remove_device+0x5c/0x7c [apr]
device_for_each_child+0xd8/0x160
apr_pd_status+0x7c/0xa8 [apr]
pdr_notifier_work+0x114/0x240 [pdr_interface]
process_one_work+0x500/0xb70
worker_thread+0x630/0xfb0
kthread+0x370/0x6c0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Allocated by task 77:
kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68
kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x44/0x58
__kasan_kmalloc+0xbc/0xdc
__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x1f4/0x620
devm_kmalloc+0x7c/0x1c8
snd_soc_register_dai+0x50/0x4f0 [snd_soc_core]
soc_tplg_pcm_elems_load+0x55c/0x1eb8 [snd_soc_core]
snd_soc_tplg_component_load+0x4f8/0xb60 [snd_soc_core]
audioreach_tplg_init+0x124/0x1fc [snd_q6apm]
q6apm_audio_probe+0x10/0x1c [snd_q6apm]
snd_soc_component_probe+0x5c/0x118 [snd_soc_core]
soc_probe_component+0x44c/0xaf0 [snd_soc_core]
snd_soc_bind_card+0xad0/0x2370 [snd_soc_core]
snd_soc_register_card+0x3b0/0x4c0 [snd_soc_core]
devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x50/0xc8 [snd_soc_core]
x1e80100_platform_probe+0x208/0x368 [snd_soc_x1e80100]
platform_probe+0xc0/0x188
really_probe+0x188/0x804
__driver_probe_device+0x158/0x358
driver_probe_device+0x60/0x190
__device_attach_driver+0x16c/0x2a8
bus_for_each_drv+0x100/0x194
__device_attach+0x174/0x380
device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
bus_probe_device+0x124/0x154
deferred_probe_work_func+0x140/0x220
process_one_work+0x500/0xb70
worker_thread+0x630/0xfb0
kthread+0x370/0x6c0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Freed by task 3426:
kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68
kasan_save_track+0x20/0x40
__kasan_save_free_info+0x4c/0x80
__kasan_slab_free+0x78/0xa0
kfree+0x100/0x4a4
devres_release_all+0x144/0x210
device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x190
device_release_driver_internal+0x350/0x468
device_release_driver+0x18/0x30
bus_remove_device+0x1a0/0x35c
device_del+0x314/0x7f0
device_unregister+0x20/0xbc
apr_remove_device+0x5c/0x7c [apr]
device_for_each_child+0xd8/0x160
apr_pd_status+0x7c/0xa8 [apr]
pdr_notifier_work+0x114/0x240 [pdr_interface]
process_one_work+0x500/0xb70
worker_thread+0x630/0xfb0
kthread+0x370/0x6c0
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: 6fire: fix use-after-free on disconnect
In usb6fire_chip_abort(), the chip struct is allocated as the card's
private data (via snd_card_new with sizeof(struct sfire_chip)). When
snd_card_free_when_closed() is called and no file handles are open, the
card and embedded chip are freed synchronously. The subsequent
chip->card = NULL write then hits freed slab memory.
Call trace:
usb6fire_chip_abort sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:59 [inline]
usb6fire_chip_disconnect+0x348/0x358 sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:182
usb_unbind_interface+0x1a8/0x88c drivers/usb/core/driver.c:458
...
hub_event+0x1a04/0x4518 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5953
Fix by moving the card lifecycle out of usb6fire_chip_abort() and into
usb6fire_chip_disconnect(). The card pointer is saved in a local
before any teardown, snd_card_disconnect() is called first to prevent
new opens, URBs are aborted while chip is still valid, and
snd_card_free_when_closed() is called last so chip is never accessed
after the card may be freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Handle the case that EIOINTC's coremap is empty
EIOINTC's coremap in eiointc_update_sw_coremap() can be empty, currently
we get a cpuid with -1 in this case, but we actually need 0 because it's
similar as the case that cpuid >= 4.
This fix an out-of-bounds access to kvm_arch::phyid_map::phys_map[]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/mm: Add missing secure storage access fixups for donated memory
There are special cases where secure storage access exceptions happen
in a kernel context for pages that don't have the PG_arch_1 bit
set. That bit is set for non-exported guest secure storage (memory)
but is absent on storage donated to the Ultravisor since the kernel
isn't allowed to export donated pages.
Prior to this patch we would try to export the page by calling
arch_make_folio_accessible() which would instantly return since the
arch bit is absent signifying that the page was already exported and
no further action is necessary. This leads to secure storage access
exception loops which can never be resolved.
With this patch we unconditionally try to export and if that fails we
fixup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fix fence put before wait in amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib
amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib() submits a GPU job and gets a fence
from amdgpu_ib_schedule(). This fence is used to wait for job
completion.
Currently, the code drops the fence reference using dma_fence_put()
before calling dma_fence_wait().
If dma_fence_put() releases the last reference, the fence may be
freed before dma_fence_wait() is called. This can lead to a
use-after-free.
Fix this by waiting on the fence first and releasing the reference
only after dma_fence_wait() completes.
Fixes the below:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd.c:697 amdgpu_amdkfd_submit_ib() warn: passing freed memory 'f' (line 696)
(cherry picked from commit 8b9e5259adc385b61a6590a13b82ae0ac2bd3482) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Fix deadlock during netdev reset with active connections
Resolve deadlock that occurs when user executes netdev reset while RDMA
applications (e.g., rping) are active. The netdev reset causes ice
driver to remove irdma auxiliary driver, triggering device_delete and
subsequent client removal. During client removal, uverbs_client waits
for QP reference count to reach zero while cma_client holds the final
reference, creating circular dependency and indefinite wait in iWARP
mode. Skip QP reference count wait during device reset to prevent
deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Fix base address calculation in kvm_eiointc_regs_access()
In function kvm_eiointc_regs_access(), the register base address is
caculated from array base address plus offset, the offset is absolute
value from the base address. The data type of array base address is
u64, it should be converted into the "void *" type and then plus the
offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/cpu: Remove X86_CR4_FRED from the CR4 pinned bits mask
Commit in Fixes added the FRED CR4 bit to the CR4 pinned bits mask so
that whenever something else modifies CR4, that bit remains set. Which
in itself is a perfectly fine idea.
However, there's an issue when during boot FRED is initialized: first on
the BSP and later on the APs. Thus, there's a window in time when
exceptions cannot be handled.
This becomes particularly nasty when running as SEV-{ES,SNP} or TDX
guests which, when they manage to trigger exceptions during that short
window described above, triple fault due to FRED MSRs not being set up
yet.
See Link tag below for a much more detailed explanation of the
situation.
So, as a result, the commit in that Link URL tried to address this
shortcoming by temporarily disabling CR4 pinning when an AP is not
online yet.
However, that is a problem in itself because in this case, an attack on
the kernel needs to only modify the online bit - a single bit in RW
memory - and then disable CR4 pinning and then disable SM*P, leading to
more and worse things to happen to the system.
So, instead, remove the FRED bit from the CR4 pinning mask, thus
obviating the need to temporarily disable CR4 pinning.
If someone manages to disable FRED when poking at CR4, then
idt_invalidate() would make sure the system would crash'n'burn on the
first exception triggered, which is a much better outcome security-wise. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Make kvm_get_vcpu_by_cpuid() more robust
kvm_get_vcpu_by_cpuid() takes a cpuid parameter whose type is int, so
cpuid can be negative. Let kvm_get_vcpu_by_cpuid() return NULL for this
case so as to make it more robust.
This fix an out-of-bounds access to kvm_arch::phyid_map::phys_map[]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: scrub: unlock dquot before early return in quota scrub
xchk_quota_item can return early after calling xchk_fblock_process_error.
When that helper returns false, the function returned immediately without
dropping dq->q_qlock, which can leave the dquot lock held and risk lock
leaks or deadlocks in later quota operations.
Fix this by unlocking dq->q_qlock before the early return. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Require sys_futex_requeue() to have identical flags
Nicholas reported that his LLM found it was possible to create a UaF
when sys_futex_requeue() is used with different flags. The initial
motivation for allowing different flags was the variable sized futex,
but since that hasn't been merged (yet), simply mandate the flags are
identical, as is the case for the old style sys_futex() requeue
operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Fix the descriptor address in __kvm_at_swap_desc()
Using "(u64 __user *)hva + offset" to get the virtual addresses of S1/S2
descriptors looks really wrong, if offset is not zero. What we want to get
for swapping is hva + offset, not hva + offset*8. ;-)
Fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: Fix static_branch_dec() underflow for aql_disable.
syzbot reported static_branch_dec() underflow in aql_enable_write(). [0]
The problem is that aql_enable_write() does not serialise concurrent
write()s to the debugfs.
aql_enable_write() checks static_key_false(&aql_disable.key) and
later calls static_branch_inc() or static_branch_dec(), but the
state may change between the two calls.
aql_disable does not need to track inc/dec.
Let's use static_branch_enable() and static_branch_disable().
[0]:
val == 0
WARNING: kernel/jump_label.c:311 at __static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x107/0x120 kernel/jump_label.c:311, CPU#0: syz.1.3155/20288
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 20288 Comm: syz.1.3155 Tainted: G U L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [U]=USER, [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/24/2026
RIP: 0010:__static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x107/0x120 kernel/jump_label.c:311
Code: f2 c9 ff 5b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 54 f2 c9 ff 48 89 df e8 ac f9 ff ff eb ad e8 45 f2 c9 ff 90 0f 0b 90 eb a2 e8 3a f2 c9 ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb 97 48 89 df e8 5c 4b 33 00 e9 36 ff ff ff 0f 1f 80 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b9f7c10 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff9b3e5d40 RCX: ffffffff823c57b4
RDX: ffff8880285a0000 RSI: ffffffff823c5846 RDI: ffff8880285a0000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000000a
R13: 1ffff9200173ef88 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc9000b9f7e98
FS: 00007f530dd726c0(0000) GS:ffff8881245e3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000200000001140 CR3: 000000007cc4a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked kernel/jump_label.c:297 [inline]
__static_key_slow_dec kernel/jump_label.c:321 [inline]
static_key_slow_dec+0x7c/0xc0 kernel/jump_label.c:336
aql_enable_write+0x2b2/0x310 net/mac80211/debugfs.c:343
short_proxy_write+0x133/0x1a0 fs/debugfs/file.c:383
vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:684
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:793 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:801 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:798 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1eb/0x250 fs/read_write.c:798
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xc9/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f530cf9aeb9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f530dd72028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000012
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f530d215fa0 RCX: 00007f530cf9aeb9
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000010
RBP: 00007f530d008c1f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 4200000000000005 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f530d216038 R14: 00007f530d215fa0 R15: 00007ffde89fb978
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Fix missing runtime PM reference in ccs_mode_store
ccs_mode_store() calls xe_gt_reset() which internally invokes
xe_pm_runtime_get_noresume(). That function requires the caller
to already hold an outer runtime PM reference and warns if none
is held:
[46.891177] xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Missing outer runtime PM protection
[46.891178] WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_pm.c:885 at
xe_pm_runtime_get_noresume+0x8b/0xc0
Fix this by protecting xe_gt_reset() with the scope-based
guard(xe_pm_runtime)(xe), which is the preferred form when
the reference lifetime matches a single scope.
v2:
- Use scope-based guard(xe_pm_runtime)(xe) (Shuicheng)
- Update commit message accordingly
(cherry picked from commit 7937ea733f79b3f25e802a0c8360bf7423856f36) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFC: nxp-nci: allow GPIOs to sleep
Allow the firmware and enable GPIOs to sleep.
This fixes a `WARN_ON' and allows the driver to operate GPIOs which are
connected to I2C GPIO expanders.
-- >8 --
kernel: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2636 at drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c:3880 gpiod_set_value+0x88/0x98
-- >8 -- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crash_dump: don't log dm-crypt key bytes in read_key_from_user_keying
When debug logging is enabled, read_key_from_user_keying() logs the first
8 bytes of the key payload and partially exposes the dm-crypt key. Stop
logging any key bytes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/platform/uv: Handle deconfigured sockets
When a socket is deconfigured, it's mapped to SOCK_EMPTY (0xffff). This causes
a panic while allocating UV hub info structures.
Fix this by using NUMA_NO_NODE, allowing UV hub info structures to be
allocated on valid nodes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gt: Check set_default_submission() before deferencing
When the i915 driver firmware binaries are not present, the
set_default_submission pointer is not set. This pointer is
dereferenced during suspend anyways.
Add a check to make sure it is set before dereferencing.
[ 23.289926] PM: suspend entry (deep)
[ 23.293558] Filesystems sync: 0.000 seconds
[ 23.298010] Freezing user space processes
[ 23.302771] Freezing user space processes completed (elapsed 0.000 seconds)
[ 23.309766] OOM killer disabled.
[ 23.313027] Freezing remaining freezable tasks
[ 23.318540] Freezing remaining freezable tasks completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds)
[ 23.342038] serial 00:05: disabled
[ 23.345719] serial 00:02: disabled
[ 23.349342] serial 00:01: disabled
[ 23.353782] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Synchronizing SCSI cache
[ 23.358993] sd 1:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronizing SCSI cache
[ 23.361635] ata1.00: Entering standby power mode
[ 23.368863] ata2.00: Entering standby power mode
[ 23.445187] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 23.452194] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[ 23.457896] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
[ 23.463065] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 23.465640] Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 23.469869] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 211 Comm: kworker/u48:18 Tainted: G S W 6.19.0-rc4-00020-gf0b9d8eb98df #10 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 23.482512] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [W]=WARN
[ 23.496511] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn
[ 23.501087] RIP: 0010:0x0
[ 23.503755] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
[ 23.510324] RSP: 0018:ffffb4a60065fca8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 23.515592] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9f428290e000 RCX: 000000000000000f
[ 23.522765] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: ffff9f428290e000
[ 23.529937] RBP: ffff9f4282907070 R08: ffff9f4281130428 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[ 23.537111] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9f42829070f8
[ 23.544284] R13: ffff9f4282906028 R14: ffff9f4282900000 R15: ffff9f4282906b68
[ 23.551457] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f466b2cf000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 23.559588] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 23.565365] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000031c230001 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0
[ 23.572539] PKRU: 55555554
[ 23.575281] Call Trace:
[ 23.577770] <TASK>
[ 23.579905] intel_engines_reset_default_submission+0x42/0x60
[ 23.585695] __intel_gt_unset_wedged+0x191/0x200
[ 23.590360] intel_gt_unset_wedged+0x20/0x40
[ 23.594675] gt_sanitize+0x15e/0x170
[ 23.598290] i915_gem_suspend_late+0x6b/0x180
[ 23.602692] i915_drm_suspend_late+0x35/0xf0
[ 23.607008] ? __pfx_pci_pm_suspend_late+0x10/0x10
[ 23.611843] dpm_run_callback+0x78/0x1c0
[ 23.615817] device_suspend_late+0xde/0x2e0
[ 23.620037] async_suspend_late+0x18/0x30
[ 23.624082] async_run_entry_fn+0x25/0xa0
[ 23.628129] process_one_work+0x15b/0x380
[ 23.632182] worker_thread+0x2a5/0x3c0
[ 23.635973] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 23.640279] kthread+0xf6/0x1f0
[ 23.643464] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 23.647263] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 23.651045] ret_from_fork+0x131/0x190
[ 23.654837] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 23.658634] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 23.662597] </TASK>
[ 23.664826] Modules linked in:
[ 23.667914] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 23.671271] ------------[ cut here ]------------
(cherry picked from commit daa199abc3d3d1740c9e3a2c3e9216ae5b447cad) |
