| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/platform/uv: Handle deconfigured sockets
When a socket is deconfigured, it's mapped to SOCK_EMPTY (0xffff). This causes
a panic while allocating UV hub info structures.
Fix this by using NUMA_NO_NODE, allowing UV hub info structures to be
allocated on valid nodes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gt: Check set_default_submission() before deferencing
When the i915 driver firmware binaries are not present, the
set_default_submission pointer is not set. This pointer is
dereferenced during suspend anyways.
Add a check to make sure it is set before dereferencing.
[ 23.289926] PM: suspend entry (deep)
[ 23.293558] Filesystems sync: 0.000 seconds
[ 23.298010] Freezing user space processes
[ 23.302771] Freezing user space processes completed (elapsed 0.000 seconds)
[ 23.309766] OOM killer disabled.
[ 23.313027] Freezing remaining freezable tasks
[ 23.318540] Freezing remaining freezable tasks completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds)
[ 23.342038] serial 00:05: disabled
[ 23.345719] serial 00:02: disabled
[ 23.349342] serial 00:01: disabled
[ 23.353782] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Synchronizing SCSI cache
[ 23.358993] sd 1:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronizing SCSI cache
[ 23.361635] ata1.00: Entering standby power mode
[ 23.368863] ata2.00: Entering standby power mode
[ 23.445187] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 23.452194] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[ 23.457896] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
[ 23.463065] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 23.465640] Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 23.469869] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 211 Comm: kworker/u48:18 Tainted: G S W 6.19.0-rc4-00020-gf0b9d8eb98df #10 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 23.482512] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [W]=WARN
[ 23.496511] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn
[ 23.501087] RIP: 0010:0x0
[ 23.503755] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
[ 23.510324] RSP: 0018:ffffb4a60065fca8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 23.515592] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9f428290e000 RCX: 000000000000000f
[ 23.522765] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: ffff9f428290e000
[ 23.529937] RBP: ffff9f4282907070 R08: ffff9f4281130428 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[ 23.537111] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9f42829070f8
[ 23.544284] R13: ffff9f4282906028 R14: ffff9f4282900000 R15: ffff9f4282906b68
[ 23.551457] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f466b2cf000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 23.559588] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 23.565365] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000031c230001 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0
[ 23.572539] PKRU: 55555554
[ 23.575281] Call Trace:
[ 23.577770] <TASK>
[ 23.579905] intel_engines_reset_default_submission+0x42/0x60
[ 23.585695] __intel_gt_unset_wedged+0x191/0x200
[ 23.590360] intel_gt_unset_wedged+0x20/0x40
[ 23.594675] gt_sanitize+0x15e/0x170
[ 23.598290] i915_gem_suspend_late+0x6b/0x180
[ 23.602692] i915_drm_suspend_late+0x35/0xf0
[ 23.607008] ? __pfx_pci_pm_suspend_late+0x10/0x10
[ 23.611843] dpm_run_callback+0x78/0x1c0
[ 23.615817] device_suspend_late+0xde/0x2e0
[ 23.620037] async_suspend_late+0x18/0x30
[ 23.624082] async_run_entry_fn+0x25/0xa0
[ 23.628129] process_one_work+0x15b/0x380
[ 23.632182] worker_thread+0x2a5/0x3c0
[ 23.635973] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 23.640279] kthread+0xf6/0x1f0
[ 23.643464] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 23.647263] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 23.651045] ret_from_fork+0x131/0x190
[ 23.654837] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 23.658634] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 23.662597] </TASK>
[ 23.664826] Modules linked in:
[ 23.667914] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 23.671271] ------------[ cut here ]------------
(cherry picked from commit daa199abc3d3d1740c9e3a2c3e9216ae5b447cad) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: smbdirect: introduce smbdirect_socket.recv_io.credits.available
The logic off managing recv credits by counting posted recv_io and
granted credits is racy.
That's because the peer might already consumed a credit,
but between receiving the incoming recv at the hardware
and processing the completion in the 'recv_done' functions
we likely have a window where we grant credits, which
don't really exist.
So we better have a decicated counter for the
available credits, which will be incremented
when we posted new recv buffers and drained when
we grant the credits to the peer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: make use of smbdirect_socket.recv_io.credits.available
The logic off managing recv credits by counting posted recv_io and
granted credits is racy.
That's because the peer might already consumed a credit,
but between receiving the incoming recv at the hardware
and processing the completion in the 'recv_done' functions
we likely have a window where we grant credits, which
don't really exist.
So we better have a decicated counter for the
available credits, which will be incremented
when we posted new recv buffers and drained when
we grant the credits to the peer.
This fixes regression Namjae reported with
the 6.18 release. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rt2x00usb: fix devres lifetime
USB drivers bind to USB interfaces and any device managed resources
should have their lifetime tied to the interface rather than parent USB
device. This avoids issues like memory leaks when drivers are unbound
without their devices being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe
deferral or configuration changes).
Fix the USB anchor lifetime so that it is released on driver unbind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: hold dev ref until after transport_finish NF_HOOK
After async crypto completes, xfrm_input_resume() calls dev_put()
immediately on re-entry before the skb reaches transport_finish.
The skb->dev pointer is then used inside NF_HOOK and its okfn,
which can race with device teardown.
Remove the dev_put from the async resumption entry and instead
drop the reference after the NF_HOOK call in transport_finish,
using a saved device pointer since NF_HOOK may consume the skb.
This covers NF_DROP, NF_QUEUE and NF_STOLEN paths that skip
the okfn.
For non-transport exits (decaps, gro, drop) and secondary
async return points, release the reference inline when
async is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: reject oversized global TT response buffers
batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() builds the allocation length for a
global TT response in 16-bit temporaries. When a remote originator
advertises a large enough global TT, the TT payload length plus the VLAN
header offset can exceed 65535 and wrap before kmalloc().
The full-table response path still uses the original TT payload length when
it fills tt_change, so the wrapped allocation is too small and
batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() writes past the end of the heap object
before the later packet-size check runs.
Fix this by rejecting TT responses whose TVLV value length cannot fit in
the 16-bit TVLV payload length field. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix call removal to use RCU safe deletion
Fix rxrpc call removal from the rxnet->calls list to use list_del_rcu()
rather than list_del_init() to prevent stuffing up reading
/proc/net/rxrpc/calls from potentially getting into an infinite loop.
This, however, means that list_empty() no longer works on an entry that's
been deleted from the list, making it harder to detect prior deletion. Fix
this by:
Firstly, make rxrpc_destroy_all_calls() only dump the first ten calls that
are unexpectedly still on the list. Limiting the number of steps means
there's no need to call cond_resched() or to remove calls from the list
here, thereby eliminating the need for rxrpc_put_call() to check for that.
rxrpc_put_call() can then be fixed to unconditionally delete the call from
the list as it is the only place that the deletion occurs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Only put the call ref if one was acquired
rxrpc_input_packet_on_conn() can process a to-client packet after the
current client call on the channel has already been torn down. In that
case chan->call is NULL, rxrpc_try_get_call() returns NULL and there is
no reference to drop.
The client-side implicit-end error path does not account for that and
unconditionally calls rxrpc_put_call(). This turns a protocol error
path into a kernel crash instead of rejecting the packet.
Only drop the call reference if one was actually acquired. Keep the
existing protocol error handling unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: reject undecryptable rxkad response tickets
rxkad_decrypt_ticket() decrypts the RXKAD response ticket and then
parses the buffer as plaintext without checking whether
crypto_skcipher_decrypt() succeeded.
A malformed RESPONSE can therefore use a non-block-aligned ticket
length, make the decrypt operation fail, and still drive the ticket
parser with attacker-controlled bytes.
Check the decrypt result and abort the connection with RXKADBADTICKET
when ticket decryption fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check
rxgk_verify_response() decodes auth_len from the packet and is supposed
to verify that it fits in the remaining bytes. The existing check is
inverted, so oversized RESPONSE authenticators are accepted and passed
to rxgk_decrypt_skb(), which can later reach skb_to_sgvec() with an
impossible length and hit BUG_ON(len).
Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:
RIP: __skb_to_sgvec()
[net/core/skbuff.c:5285 (discriminator 1)]
Call Trace:
skb_to_sgvec() [net/core/skbuff.c:5305]
rxgk_decrypt_skb() [net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h:81]
rxgk_verify_response() [net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1268]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
worker_thread()
[kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]
Reject authenticator lengths that exceed the remaining packet payload. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: fix reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring()
This patch fixes a reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring()
by checking if rx->securities is already set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output
The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into
fixed 50-byte stack buffers with "%pISpc".
That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the
formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a
dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP
addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap().
As a result, a case such as
[ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535
is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so
51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing
char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c.
Size the buffers from the formatter's maximum textual form and switch the
call sites to scnprintf().
Changes since v1:
- correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case
explicitly
- frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier
mapped-v4 example |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: gw: fix OOB heap access in cgw_csum_crc8_rel()
cgw_csum_crc8_rel() correctly computes bounds-safe indices via calc_idx():
int from = calc_idx(crc8->from_idx, cf->len);
int to = calc_idx(crc8->to_idx, cf->len);
int res = calc_idx(crc8->result_idx, cf->len);
if (from < 0 || to < 0 || res < 0)
return;
However, the loop and the result write then use the raw s8 fields directly
instead of the computed variables:
for (i = crc8->from_idx; ...) /* BUG: raw negative index */
cf->data[crc8->result_idx] = ...; /* BUG: raw negative index */
With from_idx = to_idx = result_idx = -64 on a 64-byte CAN FD frame,
calc_idx(-64, 64) = 0 so the guard passes, but the loop iterates with
i = -64, reading cf->data[-64], and the write goes to cf->data[-64].
This write might end up to 56 (7.0-rc) or 40 (<= 6.19) bytes before the
start of the canfd_frame on the heap.
The companion function cgw_csum_xor_rel() uses `from`/`to`/`res`
correctly throughout; fix cgw_csum_crc8_rel() to match.
Confirmed with KASAN on linux-7.0-rc2:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cgw_csum_crc8_rel+0x515/0x5b0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880076619c8 by task poc_cgw_oob/62
To configure the can-gw crc8 checksums CAP_NET_ADMIN is needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PM: sleep: Drop spurious WARN_ON() from pm_restore_gfp_mask()
Commit 35e4a69b2003f ("PM: sleep: Allow pm_restrict_gfp_mask()
stacking") introduced refcount-based GFP mask management that warns
when pm_restore_gfp_mask() is called with saved_gfp_count == 0.
Some hibernation paths call pm_restore_gfp_mask() defensively where
the GFP mask may or may not be restricted depending on the execution
path. For example, the uswsusp interface invokes it in
SNAPSHOT_CREATE_IMAGE, SNAPSHOT_UNFREEZE, and snapshot_release().
Before the stacking change this was a silent no-op; it now triggers
a spurious WARNING.
Remove the WARN_ON() wrapper from the !saved_gfp_count check while
retaining the check itself, so that defensive calls remain harmless
without producing false warnings.
[ rjw: Subject tweak ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: macb: Use dev_consume_skb_any() to free TX SKBs
The napi_consume_skb() function is not intended to be called in an IRQ
disabled context. However, after commit 6bc8a5098bf4 ("net: macb: Fix
tx_ptr_lock locking"), the freeing of TX SKBs is performed with IRQs
disabled. To resolve the following call trace, use dev_consume_skb_any()
for freeing TX SKBs:
WARNING: kernel/softirq.c:430 at __local_bh_enable_ip+0x174/0x188, CPU#0: ksoftirqd/0/15
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 15 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4-next-20260319-yocto-standard-dirty #37 PREEMPT
Hardware name: ZynqMP ZCU102 Rev1.1 (DT)
pstate: 200000c5 (nzCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __local_bh_enable_ip+0x174/0x188
lr : local_bh_enable+0x24/0x38
sp : ffff800082b3bb10
x29: ffff800082b3bb10 x28: ffff0008031f3c00 x27: 000000000011ede0
x26: ffff000800a7ff00 x25: ffff800083937ce8 x24: 0000000000017a80
x23: ffff000803243a78 x22: 0000000000000040 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffff000800394c80 x19: 0000000000000200 x18: 0000000000000001
x17: 0000000000000001 x16: ffff000803240000 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000028 x12: ffff000800395650
x11: ffff8000821d1528 x10: ffff800081c2bc08 x9 : ffff800081c1e258
x8 : 0000000100000301 x7 : ffff8000810426ec x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000000000200 x0 : ffff8000810428dc
Call trace:
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x174/0x188 (P)
local_bh_enable+0x24/0x38
skb_attempt_defer_free+0x190/0x1d8
napi_consume_skb+0x58/0x108
macb_tx_poll+0x1a4/0x558
__napi_poll+0x50/0x198
net_rx_action+0x1f4/0x3d8
handle_softirqs+0x16c/0x560
run_ksoftirqd+0x44/0x80
smpboot_thread_fn+0x1d8/0x338
kthread+0x120/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
irq event stamp: 29751
hardirqs last enabled at (29750): [<ffff8000813be184>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x88
hardirqs last disabled at (29751): [<ffff8000813bdf60>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x38/0x98
softirqs last enabled at (29150): [<ffff8000800f1aec>] handle_softirqs+0x504/0x560
softirqs last disabled at (29153): [<ffff8000800f2fec>] run_ksoftirqd+0x44/0x80 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Clear stale exiting pointer in futex_lock_pi() retry path
Fuzzying/stressing futexes triggered:
WARNING: kernel/futex/core.c:825 at wait_for_owner_exiting+0x7a/0x80, CPU#11: futex_lock_pi_s/524
When futex_lock_pi_atomic() sees the owner is exiting, it returns -EBUSY
and stores a refcounted task pointer in 'exiting'.
After wait_for_owner_exiting() consumes that reference, the local pointer
is never reset to nil. Upon a retry, if futex_lock_pi_atomic() returns a
different error, the bogus pointer is passed to wait_for_owner_exiting().
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
// acquires the PI futex
exit()
futex_cleanup_begin()
futex_state = EXITING;
futex_lock_pi(uaddr)
futex_lock_pi_atomic()
attach_to_pi_owner()
// observes EXITING
*exiting = owner; // takes ref
return -EBUSY
wait_for_owner_exiting(-EBUSY, owner)
put_task_struct(); // drops ref
// exiting still points to owner
goto retry;
futex_lock_pi_atomic()
lock_pi_update_atomic()
cmpxchg(uaddr)
*uaddr ^= WAITERS // whatever
// value changed
return -EAGAIN;
wait_for_owner_exiting(-EAGAIN, exiting) // stale
WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting)
Fix this by resetting upon retry, essentially aligning it with requeue_pi. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wlcore: Return -ENOMEM instead of -EAGAIN if there is not enough headroom
Since upstream commit e75665dd0968 ("wifi: wlcore: ensure skb headroom
before skb_push"), wl1271_tx_allocate() and with it
wl1271_prepare_tx_frame() returns -EAGAIN if pskb_expand_head() fails.
However, in wlcore_tx_work_locked(), a return value of -EAGAIN from
wl1271_prepare_tx_frame() is interpreted as the aggregation buffer being
full. This causes the code to flush the buffer, put the skb back at the
head of the queue, and immediately retry the same skb in a tight while
loop.
Because wlcore_tx_work_locked() holds wl->mutex, and the retry happens
immediately with GFP_ATOMIC, this will result in an infinite loop and a
CPU soft lockup. Return -ENOMEM instead so the packet is dropped and
the loop terminates.
The problem was found by an experimental code review agent based on
gemini-3.1-pro while reviewing backports into v6.18.y. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pmdomain: bcm: bcm2835-power: Increase ASB control timeout
The bcm2835_asb_control() function uses a tight polling loop to wait
for the ASB bridge to acknowledge a request. During intensive workloads,
this handshake intermittently fails for V3D's master ASB on BCM2711,
resulting in "Failed to disable ASB master for v3d" errors during
runtime PM suspend. As a consequence, the failed power-off leaves V3D in
a broken state, leading to bus faults or system hangs on later accesses.
As the timeout is insufficient in some scenarios, increase the polling
timeout from 1us to 5us, which is still negligible in the context of a
power domain transition. Also, replace the open-coded ktime_get_ns()/
cpu_relax() polling loop with readl_poll_timeout_atomic(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: cp2615: fix serial string NULL-deref at probe
The cp2615 driver uses the USB device serial string as the i2c adapter
name but does not make sure that the string exists.
Verify that the device has a serial number before accessing it to avoid
triggering a NULL-pointer dereference (e.g. with malicious devices). |
