| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: cfm: Fix race condition in peer_mep deletion
When a peer MEP is being deleted, cancel_delayed_work_sync() is called
on ccm_rx_dwork before freeing. However, br_cfm_frame_rx() runs in
softirq context under rcu_read_lock (without RTNL) and can re-schedule
ccm_rx_dwork via ccm_rx_timer_start() between cancel_delayed_work_sync()
returning and kfree_rcu() being called.
The following is a simple race scenario:
cpu0 cpu1
mep_delete_implementation()
cancel_delayed_work_sync(ccm_rx_dwork);
br_cfm_frame_rx()
// peer_mep still in hlist
if (peer_mep->ccm_defect)
ccm_rx_timer_start()
queue_delayed_work(ccm_rx_dwork)
hlist_del_rcu(&peer_mep->head);
kfree_rcu(peer_mep, rcu);
ccm_rx_work_expired()
// on freed peer_mep
To prevent this, cancel_delayed_work_sync() is replaced with
disable_delayed_work_sync() in both peer MEP deletion paths, so
that subsequent queue_delayed_work() calls from br_cfm_frame_rx()
are silently rejected.
The cc_peer_disable() helper retains cancel_delayed_work_sync()
because it is also used for the CC enable/disable toggle path where
the work must remain re-schedulable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: release flowtable after rcu grace period on error
Call synchronize_rcu() after unregistering the hooks from error path,
since a hook that already refers to this flowtable can be already
registered, exposing this flowtable to packet path and nfnetlink_hook
control plane.
This error path is rare, it should only happen by reaching the maximum
number hooks or by failing to set up to hardware offload, just call
synchronize_rcu().
There is a check for already used device hooks by different flowtable
that could result in EEXIST at this late stage. The hook parser can be
updated to perform this check earlier to this error path really becomes
rarely exercised.
Uncovered by KASAN reported as use-after-free from nfnetlink_hook path
when dumping hooks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: fix incorrect buffer cleanup in gve_tx_clean_pending_packets for QPL
In DQ-QPL mode, gve_tx_clean_pending_packets() incorrectly uses the RDA
buffer cleanup path. It iterates num_bufs times and attempts to unmap
entries in the dma array.
This leads to two issues:
1. The dma array shares storage with tx_qpl_buf_ids (union).
Interpreting buffer IDs as DMA addresses results in attempting to
unmap incorrect memory locations.
2. num_bufs in QPL mode (counting 2K chunks) can significantly exceed
the size of the dma array, causing out-of-bounds access warnings
(trace below is how we noticed this issue).
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in
drivers/net/ethernet/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_tx_dqo.c:178:5 index 18 is out of
range for type 'dma_addr_t[18]' (aka 'unsigned long long[18]')
Workqueue: gve gve_service_task [gve]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0xa0
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xdc/0x110
gve_tx_stop_ring_dqo+0x182/0x200 [gve]
gve_close+0x1be/0x450 [gve]
gve_reset+0x99/0x120 [gve]
gve_service_task+0x61/0x100 [gve]
process_scheduled_works+0x1e9/0x380
Fix this by properly checking for QPL mode and delegating to
gve_free_tx_qpl_bufs() to reclaim the buffers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: clone set on flush only
Syzbot with fault injection triggered a failing memory allocation with
GFP_KERNEL which results in a WARN splat:
iter.err
WARNING: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845 at nft_map_deactivate+0x34e/0x3c0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845, CPU#0: syz.0.17/5992
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5992 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026
RIP: 0010:nft_map_deactivate+0x34e/0x3c0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845
Code: 8b 05 86 5a 4e 09 48 3b 84 24 a0 00 00 00 75 62 48 8d 65 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc e8 63 6d fa f7 90 <0f> 0b 90 43
+80 7c 35 00 00 0f 85 23 fe ff ff e9 26 fe ff ff 89 d9
RSP: 0018:ffffc900045af780 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff89ca45bd RBX: 00000000fffffff4 RCX: ffff888028111e40
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffffff4 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc900045af870 R08: 0000000000400dc0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d141db R12: ffffc900045af7e0
R13: 1ffff920008b5f24 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffc900045af920
FS: 000055557a6a5500(0000) GS:ffff888125496000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fb5ea271fc0 CR3: 000000003269e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__nft_release_table+0xceb/0x11f0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:12115
nft_rcv_nl_event+0xc25/0xdb0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:12187
notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6a/0x90 kernel/notifier.c:380
netlink_release+0x123b/0x1ad0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:761
__sock_release net/socket.c:662 [inline]
sock_close+0xc3/0x240 net/socket.c:1455
Restrict set clone to the flush set command in the preparation phase.
Add NFT_ITER_UPDATE_CLONE and use it for this purpose, update the rbtree
and pipapo backends to only clone the set when this iteration type is
used.
As for the existing NFT_ITER_UPDATE type, update the pipapo backend to
use the existing set clone if available, otherwise use the existing set
representation. After this update, there is no need to clone a set that
is being deleted, this includes bound anonymous set.
An alternative approach to NFT_ITER_UPDATE_CLONE is to add a .clone
interface and call it from the flush set path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/ionic: Fix kernel stack leak in ionic_create_cq()
struct ionic_cq_resp resp {
__u32 cqid[2]; // offset 0 - PARTIALLY SET (see below)
__u8 udma_mask; // offset 8 - SET (resp.udma_mask = vcq->udma_mask)
__u8 rsvd[7]; // offset 9 - NEVER SET <- LEAK
};
rsvd[7]: 7 bytes of stack memory leaked unconditionally.
cqid[2]: The loop at line 1256 iterates over udma_idx but skips indices
where !(vcq->udma_mask & BIT(udma_idx)). The array has 2 entries but
udma_count could be 1, meaning cqid[1] might never be written via
ionic_create_cq_common(). If udma_mask only has bit 0 set, cqid[1] (4
bytes) is also leaked. So potentially 11 bytes leaked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, arm64: Force 8-byte alignment for JIT buffer to prevent atomic tearing
struct bpf_plt contains a u64 target field. Currently, the BPF JIT
allocator requests an alignment of 4 bytes (sizeof(u32)) for the JIT
buffer.
Because the base address of the JIT buffer can be 4-byte aligned (e.g.,
ending in 0x4 or 0xc), the relative padding logic in build_plt() fails
to ensure that target lands on an 8-byte boundary.
This leads to two issues:
1. UBSAN reports misaligned-access warnings when dereferencing the
structure.
2. More critically, target is updated concurrently via WRITE_ONCE() in
bpf_arch_text_poke() while the JIT'd code executes ldr. On arm64,
64-bit loads/stores are only guaranteed to be single-copy atomic if
they are 64-bit aligned. A misaligned target risks a torn read,
causing the JIT to jump to a corrupted address.
Fix this by increasing the allocation alignment requirement to 8 bytes
(sizeof(u64)) in bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(). This anchors the base of
the JIT buffer to an 8-byte boundary, allowing the relative padding math
in build_plt() to correctly align the target field. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: Add HID_CLAIMED_INPUT guards in raw_event callbacks missing them
In commit 2ff5baa9b527 ("HID: appleir: Fix potential NULL dereference at
raw event handle"), we handle the fact that raw event callbacks
can happen even for a HID device that has not been "claimed" causing a
crash if a broken device were attempted to be connected to the system.
Fix up the remaining in-tree HID drivers that forgot to add this same
check to resolve the same issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: fix nd_tbl NULL dereference when IPv6 is disabled
When booting with the 'ipv6.disable=1' parameter, the nd_tbl is never
initialized because inet6_init() exits before ndisc_init() is called
which initializes it. Then, if neigh_suppress is enabled and an ICMPv6
Neighbor Discovery packet reaches the bridge, br_do_suppress_nd() will
dereference ipv6_stub->nd_tbl which is NULL, passing it to
neigh_lookup(). This causes a kernel NULL pointer dereference.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000268
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[...]
RIP: 0010:neigh_lookup+0x16/0xe0
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? neigh_lookup+0x16/0xe0
br_do_suppress_nd+0x160/0x290 [bridge]
br_handle_frame_finish+0x500/0x620 [bridge]
br_handle_frame+0x353/0x440 [bridge]
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x298/0x1110
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x3d/0xa0
process_backlog+0xa0/0x140
__napi_poll+0x2c/0x170
net_rx_action+0x2c4/0x3a0
handle_softirqs+0xd0/0x270
do_softirq+0x3f/0x60
Fix this by replacing IS_ENABLED(IPV6) call with ipv6_mod_enabled() in
the callers. This is in essence disabling NS/NA suppression when IPv6 is
disabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: register phy led_triggers during probe to avoid AB-BA deadlock
There is an AB-BA deadlock when both LEDS_TRIGGER_NETDEV and
LED_TRIGGER_PHY are enabled:
[ 1362.049207] [<8054e4b8>] led_trigger_register+0x5c/0x1fc <-- Trying to get lock "triggers_list_lock" via down_write(&triggers_list_lock);
[ 1362.054536] [<80662830>] phy_led_triggers_register+0xd0/0x234
[ 1362.060329] [<8065e200>] phy_attach_direct+0x33c/0x40c
[ 1362.065489] [<80651fc4>] phylink_fwnode_phy_connect+0x15c/0x23c
[ 1362.071480] [<8066ee18>] mtk_open+0x7c/0xba0
[ 1362.075849] [<806d714c>] __dev_open+0x280/0x2b0
[ 1362.080384] [<806d7668>] __dev_change_flags+0x244/0x24c
[ 1362.085598] [<806d7698>] dev_change_flags+0x28/0x78
[ 1362.090528] [<807150e4>] dev_ioctl+0x4c0/0x654 <-- Hold lock "rtnl_mutex" by calling rtnl_lock();
[ 1362.094985] [<80694360>] sock_ioctl+0x2f4/0x4e0
[ 1362.099567] [<802e9c4c>] sys_ioctl+0x32c/0xd8c
[ 1362.104022] [<80014504>] syscall_common+0x34/0x58
Here LED_TRIGGER_PHY is registering LED triggers during phy_attach
while holding RTNL and then taking triggers_list_lock.
[ 1362.191101] [<806c2640>] register_netdevice_notifier+0x60/0x168 <-- Trying to get lock "rtnl_mutex" via rtnl_lock();
[ 1362.197073] [<805504ac>] netdev_trig_activate+0x194/0x1e4
[ 1362.202490] [<8054e28c>] led_trigger_set+0x1d4/0x360 <-- Hold lock "triggers_list_lock" by down_read(&triggers_list_lock);
[ 1362.207511] [<8054eb38>] led_trigger_write+0xd8/0x14c
[ 1362.212566] [<80381d98>] sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xbc
[ 1362.217688] [<8037fcd8>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x17c/0x28c
[ 1362.223174] [<802cbd70>] vfs_write+0x21c/0x3c4
[ 1362.227712] [<802cc0c4>] ksys_write+0x78/0x12c
[ 1362.232164] [<80014504>] syscall_common+0x34/0x58
Here LEDS_TRIGGER_NETDEV is being enabled on an LED. It first takes
triggers_list_lock and then RTNL. A classical AB-BA deadlock.
phy_led_triggers_registers() does not require the RTNL, it does not
make any calls into the network stack which require protection. There
is also no requirement the PHY has been attached to a MAC, the
triggers only make use of phydev state. This allows the call to
phy_led_triggers_registers() to be placed elsewhere. PHY probe() and
release() don't hold RTNL, so solving the AB-BA deadlock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: radiotap: reject radiotap with unknown bits
The radiotap parser is currently only used with the radiotap
namespace (not with vendor namespaces), but if the undefined
field 18 is used, the alignment/size is unknown as well. In
this case, iterator->_next_ns_data isn't initialized (it's
only set for skipping vendor namespaces), and syzbot points
out that we later compare against this uninitialized value.
Fix this by moving the rejection of unknown radiotap fields
down to after the in-namespace lookup, so it will really use
iterator->_next_ns_data only for vendor namespaces, even in
case undefined fields are present. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/client: Do not destroy NULL modes
'modes' in drm_client_modeset_probe may fail to kcalloc. If this
occurs, we jump to 'out', calling modes_destroy on it, which
dereferences it. This may result in a NULL pointer dereference in the
error case. Prevent that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: fix locking for bcm_op runtime updates
Commit c2aba69d0c36 ("can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updates")
added a locking for some variables that can be modified at runtime when
updating the sending bcm_op with a new TX_SETUP command in bcm_tx_setup().
Usually the RX_SETUP only handles and filters incoming traffic with one
exception: When the RX_RTR_FRAME flag is set a predefined CAN frame is
sent when a specific RTR frame is received. Therefore the rx bcm_op uses
bcm_can_tx() which uses the bcm_tx_lock that was only initialized in
bcm_tx_setup(). Add the missing spin_lock_init() when allocating the
bcm_op in bcm_rx_setup() to handle the RTR case properly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: dwc: ep: Flush MSI-X write before unmapping its ATU entry
Endpoint drivers use dw_pcie_ep_raise_msix_irq() to raise an MSI-X
interrupt to the host using a writel(), which generates a PCI posted write
transaction. There's no completion for posted writes, so the writel() may
return before the PCI write completes. dw_pcie_ep_raise_msix_irq() also
unmaps the outbound ATU entry used for the PCI write, so the write races
with the unmap.
If the PCI write loses the race with the ATU unmap, the write may corrupt
host memory or cause IOMMU errors, e.g., these when running fio with a
larger queue depth against nvmet-pci-epf:
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000010000000010
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000020000000000
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x000000090000f040
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000000000000000
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: event: F_TRANSLATION client: 0000:01:00.0 sid: 0x100 ssid: 0x0 iova: 0x90000f040 ipa: 0x0
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: unpriv data write s1 "Input address caused fault" stag: 0x0
Flush the write by performing a readl() of the same address to ensure that
the write has reached the destination before the ATU entry is unmapped.
The same problem was solved for dw_pcie_ep_raise_msi_irq() in commit
8719c64e76bf ("PCI: dwc: ep: Cache MSI outbound iATU mapping"), but there
it was solved by dedicating an outbound iATU only for MSI. We can't do the
same for MSI-X because each vector can have a different msg_addr and the
msg_addr may be changed while the vector is masked.
[bhelgaas: commit log] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix crash in ethtool offline loopback test
Since the conversion of ice to page pool, the ethtool loopback test
crashes:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000c
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 1100f1067 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 23 UID: 0 PID: 5904 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.19.0-0.rc7.260128g1f97d9dcf5364.49.eln154.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: [...]
RIP: 0010:ice_alloc_rx_bufs+0x1cd/0x310 [ice]
Code: 83 6c 24 30 01 66 41 89 47 08 0f 84 c0 00 00 00 41 0f b7 dc 48 8b 44 24 18 48 c1 e3 04 41 bb 00 10 00 00 48 8d 2c 18 8b 04 24 <89> 45 0c 41 8b 4d 00 49 d3 e3 44 3b 5c 24 24 0f 83 ac fe ff ff 44
RSP: 0018:ff7894738aa1f768 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000700 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ff16dcae79880200 R09: 0000000000000019
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff16dcae6c670000
FS: 00007fcf428850c0(0000) GS:ff16dcb149710000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000000c CR3: 0000000121227005 CR4: 0000000000773ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ice_vsi_cfg_rxq+0xca/0x460 [ice]
ice_vsi_cfg_rxqs+0x54/0x70 [ice]
ice_loopback_test+0xa9/0x520 [ice]
ice_self_test+0x1b9/0x280 [ice]
ethtool_self_test+0xe5/0x200
__dev_ethtool+0x1106/0x1a90
dev_ethtool+0xbe/0x1a0
dev_ioctl+0x258/0x4c0
sock_do_ioctl+0xe3/0x130
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xb9/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x700
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[...]
It crashes because we have not initialized libeth for the rx ring.
Fix it by treating ICE_VSI_LB VSIs slightly more like normal PF VSIs and
letting them have a q_vector. It's just a dummy, because the loopback
test does not use interrupts, but it contains a napi struct that can be
passed to libeth_rx_fq_create() called from ice_vsi_cfg_rxq() ->
ice_rxq_pp_create(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: split gc into unlink and reclaim phase
Yiming Qian reports Use-after-free in the pipapo set type:
Under a large number of expired elements, commit-time GC can run for a very
long time in a non-preemptible context, triggering soft lockup warnings and
RCU stall reports (local denial of service).
We must split GC in an unlink and a reclaim phase.
We cannot queue elements for freeing until pointers have been swapped.
Expired elements are still exposed to both the packet path and userspace
dumpers via the live copy of the data structure.
call_rcu() does not protect us: dump operations or element lookups starting
after call_rcu has fired can still observe the free'd element, unless the
commit phase has made enough progress to swap the clone and live pointers
before any new reader has picked up the old version.
This a similar approach as done recently for the rbtree backend in commit
35f83a75529a ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: don't gc elements on insert"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/queue: Call fini on exec queue creation fail
Every call to queue init should have a corresponding fini call.
Skipping this would mean skipping removal of the queue from GuC list
(which is part of guc_id allocation). A damaged queue stored in
exec_queue_lookup list would lead to invalid memory reference,
sooner or later.
Call fini to free guc_id. This must be done before any internal
LRCs are freed.
Since the finalization with this extra call became very similar to
__xe_exec_queue_fini(), reuse that. To make this reuse possible,
alter xe_lrc_put() so it can survive NULL parameters, like other
similar functions.
v2: Reuse _xe_exec_queue_fini(). Make xe_lrc_put() aware of NULLs.
(cherry picked from commit 393e5fea6f7d7054abc2c3d97a4cfe8306cd6079) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: pidff: Fix condition effect bit clearing
As reported by MPDarkGuy on discord, NULL pointer dereferences were
happening because not all the conditional effects bits were cleared.
Properly clear all conditional effect bits from ffbit |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl: Fix race of nvdimm_bus object when creating nvdimm objects
Found issue during running of cxl-translate.sh unit test. Adding a 3s
sleep right before the test seems to make the issue reproduce fairly
consistently. The cxl_translate module has dependency on cxl_acpi and
causes orphaned nvdimm objects to reprobe after cxl_acpi is removed.
The nvdimm_bus object is registered by the cxl_nvb object when
cxl_acpi_probe() is called. With the nvdimm_bus object missing,
__nd_device_register() will trigger NULL pointer dereference when
accessing the dev->parent that points to &nvdimm_bus->dev.
[ 192.884510] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000006c
[ 192.895383] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS edk2-20250812-19.fc42 08/12/2025
[ 192.897721] Workqueue: cxl_port cxl_bus_rescan_queue [cxl_core]
[ 192.899459] RIP: 0010:kobject_get+0xc/0x90
[ 192.924871] Call Trace:
[ 192.925959] <TASK>
[ 192.926976] ? pm_runtime_init+0xb9/0xe0
[ 192.929712] __nd_device_register.part.0+0x4d/0xc0 [libnvdimm]
[ 192.933314] __nvdimm_create+0x206/0x290 [libnvdimm]
[ 192.936662] cxl_nvdimm_probe+0x119/0x1d0 [cxl_pmem]
[ 192.940245] cxl_bus_probe+0x1a/0x60 [cxl_core]
[ 192.943349] really_probe+0xde/0x380
This patch also relies on the previous change where
devm_cxl_add_nvdimm_bridge() is called from drivers/cxl/pmem.c instead
of drivers/cxl/core.c to ensure the dependency of cxl_acpi on cxl_pmem.
1. Set probe_type of cxl_nvb to PROBE_FORCE_SYNCHRONOUS to ensure the
driver is probed synchronously when add_device() is called.
2. Add a check in __devm_cxl_add_nvdimm_bridge() to ensure that the
cxl_nvb driver is attached during cxl_acpi_probe().
3. Take the cxl_root uport_dev lock and the cxl_nvb->dev lock in
devm_cxl_add_nvdimm() before checking nvdimm_bus is valid.
4. Set cxl_nvdimm flag to CXL_NVD_F_INVALIDATED so cxl_nvdimm_probe()
will exit with -EBUSY.
The removal of cxl_nvdimm devices should prevent any orphaned devices
from probing once the nvdimm_bus is gone.
[ dj: Fixed 0-day reported kdoc issue. ]
[ dj: Fix cxl_nvb reference leak on error. Gregory (kreview-0811365) ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: usb: f81604: correctly anchor the urb in the read bulk callback
When submitting an urb, that is using the anchor pattern, it needs to be
anchored before submitting it otherwise it could be leaked if
usb_kill_anchored_urbs() is called. This logic is correctly done
elsewhere in the driver, except in the read bulk callback so do that
here also. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()
The only caller of ioremap_prot() outside of the generic ioremap()
implementation is generic_access_phys(), which passes a 'pgprot_t' value
determined from the user mapping of the target 'pfn' being accessed by
the kernel. On arm64, the 'pgprot_t' contains all of the non-address
bits from the pte, including the permission controls, and so we end up
returning a new user mapping from ioremap_prot() which faults when
accessed from the kernel on systems with PAN:
| Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address ffff80008ea89000
| ...
| Call trace:
| __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8
| generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8
| __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8
| access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30
| environ_read+0x238/0x3e8
| vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0
| ksys_read+0xcc/0x178
| __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68
Extract only the memory type from the user 'pgprot_t' in ioremap_prot()
and assert that we're being passed a user mapping, to protect us against
any changes in future that may require additional handling. To avoid
falsely flagging users of ioremap(), provide our own ioremap() macro
which simply wraps __ioremap_prot(). |
