| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Libgcrypt before 1.12.2 sometimes allows a heap-based buffer overflow and denial of service via crafted ECDH ciphertext to gcry_pk_decrypt. |
| Libgcrypt before 1.12.2 mishandles Dilithium signing. Writes to a static array lack a bounds check but do not use attacker-controlled data. |
| A critical XSS vulnerability affected hackage-server and
hackage.haskell.org. HTML and JavaScript files provided in source
packages or via the documentation upload facility were served
as-is on the main hackage.haskell.org domain. As a consequence,
when a user with latent HTTP credentials browses to the package
pages or documentation uploaded by a malicious package maintainer,
their session can be hijacked to upload packages or
documentation, amend maintainers or other package metadata, or
perform any other action the user is authorised to do. |
| A flaw was found in the X.Org X server. This use-after-free vulnerability occurs in the XSYNC fence triggering logic, specifically within the miSyncTriggerFence() function. An attacker with access to the X11 server can exploit this without user interaction, leading to a server crash and potentially enabling memory corruption. This could result in a denial of service or further compromise of the system. |
| hackage-server lacked Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection across its endpoints. Scripts on foreign sites could trigger requests to hackage server, possibly abusing latent credentials to upload packages or perform other administrative actions. Some unauthenticated actions could also be abused (e.g. creating new user accounts). |
| In hackage-server, user-controlled metadata from .cabal files are rendered into HTML
href attributes without proper sanitization, enabling stored
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: asus: avoid memory leak in asus_report_fixup()
The asus_report_fixup() function was returning a newly allocated
kmemdup()-allocated buffer, but never freeing it. Switch to
devm_kzalloc() to ensure the memory is managed and freed automatically
when the device is removed.
The caller of report_fixup() does not take ownership of the returned
pointer, but it is permitted to return a pointer whose lifetime is at
least that of the input buffer.
Also fix a harmless out-of-bounds read by copying only the original
descriptor size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: avoid infinite loops caused by residual data
On the mkdir/mknod path, when mapping logical blocks to physical blocks,
if inserting a new extent into the extent tree fails (in this example,
because the file system disabled the huge file feature when marking the
inode as dirty), ext4_ext_map_blocks() only calls ext4_free_blocks() to
reclaim the physical block without deleting the corresponding data in
the extent tree. This causes subsequent mkdir operations to reference
the previously reclaimed physical block number again, even though this
physical block is already being used by the xattr block. Therefore, a
situation arises where both the directory and xattr are using the same
buffer head block in memory simultaneously.
The above causes ext4_xattr_block_set() to enter an infinite loop about
"inserted" and cannot release the inode lock, ultimately leading to the
143s blocking problem mentioned in [1].
If the metadata is corrupted, then trying to remove some extent space
can do even more harm. Also in case EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE
was passed, remove space wrongly update quota information.
Jan Kara suggests distinguishing between two cases:
1) The error is ENOSPC or EDQUOT - in this case the filesystem is fully
consistent and we must maintain its consistency including all the
accounting. However these errors can happen only early before we've
inserted the extent into the extent tree. So current code works correctly
for this case.
2) Some other error - this means metadata is corrupted. We should strive to
do as few modifications as possible to limit damage. So I'd just skip
freeing of allocated blocks.
[1]
INFO: task syz.0.17:5995 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Call Trace:
inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:1073 [inline]
__start_dirop fs/namei.c:2923 [inline]
start_dirop fs/namei.c:2934 [inline] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: set BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP during subvol create
We have recently observed a number of subvolumes with broken dentries.
ls-ing the parent dir looks like:
drwxrwxrwt 1 root root 16 Jan 23 16:49 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 24 Jan 23 16:48 ..
d????????? ? ? ? ? ? broken_subvol
and similarly stat-ing the file fails.
In this state, deleting the subvol fails with ENOENT, but attempting to
create a new file or subvol over it errors out with EEXIST and even
aborts the fs. Which leaves us a bit stuck.
dmesg contains a single notable error message reading:
"could not do orphan cleanup -2"
2 is ENOENT and the error comes from the failure handling path of
btrfs_orphan_cleanup(), with the stack leading back up to
btrfs_lookup().
btrfs_lookup
btrfs_lookup_dentry
btrfs_orphan_cleanup // prints that message and returns -ENOENT
After some detailed inspection of the internal state, it became clear
that:
- there are no orphan items for the subvol
- the subvol is otherwise healthy looking, it is not half-deleted or
anything, there is no drop progress, etc.
- the subvol was created a while ago and does the meaningful first
btrfs_orphan_cleanup() call that sets BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP much
later.
- after btrfs_orphan_cleanup() fails, btrfs_lookup_dentry() returns -ENOENT,
which results in a negative dentry for the subvolume via
d_splice_alias(NULL, dentry), leading to the observed behavior. The
bug can be mitigated by dropping the dentry cache, at which point we
can successfully delete the subvolume if we want.
i.e.,
btrfs_lookup()
btrfs_lookup_dentry()
if (!sb_rdonly(inode->vfs_inode)->vfs_inode)
btrfs_orphan_cleanup(sub_root)
test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP)
btrfs_search_slot() // finds orphan item for inode N
...
prints "could not do orphan cleanup -2"
if (inode == ERR_PTR(-ENOENT))
inode = NULL;
return d_splice_alias(NULL, dentry) // NEGATIVE DENTRY for valid subvolume
btrfs_orphan_cleanup() does test_and_set_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP)
on the root when it runs, so it cannot run more than once on a given
root, so something else must run concurrently. However, the obvious
routes to deleting an orphan when nlinks goes to 0 should not be able to
run without first doing a lookup into the subvolume, which should run
btrfs_orphan_cleanup() and set the bit.
The final important observation is that create_subvol() calls
d_instantiate_new() but does not set BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP, so if
the dentry cache gets dropped, the next lookup into the subvolume will
make a real call into btrfs_orphan_cleanup() for the first time. This
opens up the possibility of concurrently deleting the inode/orphan items
but most typical evict() paths will be holding a reference on the parent
dentry (child dentry holds parent->d_lockref.count via dget in
d_alloc(), released in __dentry_kill()) and prevent the parent from
being removed from the dentry cache.
The one exception is delayed iputs. Ordered extent creation calls
igrab() on the inode. If the file is unlinked and closed while those
refs are held, iput() in __dentry_kill() decrements i_count but does
not trigger eviction (i_count > 0). The child dentry is freed and the
subvol dentry's d_lockref.count drops to 0, making it evictable while
the inode is still alive.
Since there are two races (the race between writeback and unlink and
the race between lookup and delayed iputs), and there are too many moving
parts, the following three diagrams show the complete picture.
(Only the second and third are races)
Phase 1:
Create Subvol in dentry cache without BTRFS_ROOT_ORPHAN_CLEANUP set
btrfs_mksubvol()
lookup_one_len()
__lookup_slow()
d_alloc_parallel()
__d_alloc() // d_lockref.count = 1
create_subvol(dentry)
// doesn't touch the bit..
d_instantiate_new(dentry, inode) // dentry in cache with d_lockref.c
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: reject mount if bigalloc with s_first_data_block != 0
bigalloc with s_first_data_block != 0 is not supported, reject mounting
it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Fix drm_edid leak in amdgpu_dm
[WHAT]
When a sink is connected, aconnector->drm_edid was overwritten without
freeing the previous allocation, causing a memory leak on resume.
[HOW]
Free the previous drm_edid before updating it.
(cherry picked from commit 52024a94e7111366141cfc5d888b2ef011f879e5) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: prevent immediate PASID reuse case
PASID resue could cause interrupt issue when process
immediately runs into hw state left by previous
process exited with the same PASID, it's possible that
page faults are still pending in the IH ring buffer when
the process exits and frees up its PASID. To prevent the
case, it uses idr cyclic allocator same as kernel pid's.
(cherry picked from commit 8f1de51f49be692de137c8525106e0fce2d1912d) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: apple: avoid memory leak in apple_report_fixup()
The apple_report_fixup() function was returning a
newly kmemdup()-allocated buffer, but never freeing it.
The caller of report_fixup() does not take ownership of the returned
pointer, but it *is* permitted to return a sub-portion of the input
rdesc, whose lifetime is managed by the caller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: magicmouse: avoid memory leak in magicmouse_report_fixup()
The magicmouse_report_fixup() function was returning a
newly kmemdup()-allocated buffer, but never freeing it.
The caller of report_fixup() does not take ownership of the returned
pointer, but it *is* permitted to return a sub-portion of the input
rdesc, whose lifetime is managed by the caller. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: validate p_idx bounds in ext4_ext_correct_indexes
ext4_ext_correct_indexes() walks up the extent tree correcting
index entries when the first extent in a leaf is modified. Before
accessing path[k].p_idx->ei_block, there is no validation that
p_idx falls within the valid range of index entries for that
level.
If the on-disk extent header contains a corrupted or crafted
eh_entries value, p_idx can point past the end of the allocated
buffer, causing a slab-out-of-bounds read.
Fix this by validating path[k].p_idx against EXT_LAST_INDEX() at
both access sites: before the while loop and inside it. Return
-EFSCORRUPTED if the index pointer is out of range, consistent
with how other bounds violations are handled in the ext4 extent
tree code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: replace BUG_ON with proper error handling in ext4_read_inline_folio
Replace BUG_ON() with proper error handling when inline data size
exceeds PAGE_SIZE. This prevents kernel panic and allows the system to
continue running while properly reporting the filesystem corruption.
The error is logged via ext4_error_inode(), the buffer head is released
to prevent memory leak, and -EFSCORRUPTED is returned to indicate
filesystem corruption. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: convert inline data to extents when truncate exceeds inline size
Add a check in ext4_setattr() to convert files from inline data storage
to extent-based storage when truncate() grows the file size beyond the
inline capacity. This prevents the filesystem from entering an
inconsistent state where the inline data flag is set but the file size
exceeds what can be stored inline.
Without this fix, the following sequence causes a kernel BUG_ON():
1. Mount filesystem with inode that has inline flag set and small size
2. truncate(file, 50MB) - grows size but inline flag remains set
3. sendfile() attempts to write data
4. ext4_write_inline_data() hits BUG_ON(write_size > inline_capacity)
The crash occurs because ext4_write_inline_data() expects inline storage
to accommodate the write, but the actual inline capacity (~60 bytes for
i_block + ~96 bytes for xattrs) is far smaller than the file size and
write request.
The fix checks if the new size from setattr exceeds the inode's actual
inline capacity (EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size) and converts the file to
extent-based storage before proceeding with the size change.
This addresses the root cause by ensuring the inline data flag and file
size remain consistent during truncate operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: add GFP_NOIO in the bio completion if needed
The bio completion path in the process context (e.g. dm-verity)
will directly call into decompression rather than trigger another
workqueue context for minimal scheduling latencies, which can
then call vm_map_ram() with GFP_KERNEL.
Due to insufficient memory, vm_map_ram() may generate memory
swapping I/O, which can cause submit_bio_wait to deadlock
in some scenarios.
Trimmed down the call stack, as follows:
f2fs_submit_read_io
submit_bio //bio_list is initialized.
mmc_blk_mq_recovery
z_erofs_endio
vm_map_ram
__pte_alloc_kernel
__alloc_pages_direct_reclaim
shrink_folio_list
__swap_writepage
submit_bio_wait //bio_list is non-NULL, hang!!!
Use memalloc_noio_{save,restore}() to wrap up this path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: do not expire session on binding failure
When a multichannel session binding request fails (e.g. wrong password),
the error path unconditionally sets sess->state = SMB2_SESSION_EXPIRED.
However, during binding, sess points to the target session looked up via
ksmbd_session_lookup_slowpath() -- which belongs to another connection's
user. This allows a remote attacker to invalidate any active session by
simply sending a binding request with a wrong password (DoS).
Fix this by skipping session expiration when the failed request was
a binding attempt, since the session does not belong to the current
connection. The reference taken by ksmbd_session_lookup_slowpath() is
still correctly released via ksmbd_user_session_put(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
module: Fix kernel panic when a symbol st_shndx is out of bounds
The module loader doesn't check for bounds of the ELF section index in
simplify_symbols():
for (i = 1; i < symsec->sh_size / sizeof(Elf_Sym); i++) {
const char *name = info->strtab + sym[i].st_name;
switch (sym[i].st_shndx) {
case SHN_COMMON:
[...]
default:
/* Divert to percpu allocation if a percpu var. */
if (sym[i].st_shndx == info->index.pcpu)
secbase = (unsigned long)mod_percpu(mod);
else
/** HERE --> **/ secbase = info->sechdrs[sym[i].st_shndx].sh_addr;
sym[i].st_value += secbase;
break;
}
}
A symbol with an out-of-bounds st_shndx value, for example 0xffff
(known as SHN_XINDEX or SHN_HIRESERVE), may cause a kernel panic:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ...
RIP: 0010:simplify_symbols+0x2b2/0x480
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
This can happen when module ELF is legitimately using SHN_XINDEX or
when it is corrupted.
Add a bounds check in simplify_symbols() to validate that st_shndx is
within the valid range before using it.
This issue was discovered due to a bug in llvm-objcopy, see relevant
discussion for details [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-modules/20251224005752.201911-1-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev/ |
