| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: limit the level of fs stacking for file-backed mounts
Otherwise, it could cause potential kernel stack overflow (e.g., EROFS
mounting itself). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: wed: use proper wed reference in mt76 wed driver callabacks
MT7996 driver can use both wed and wed_hif2 devices to offload traffic
from/to the wireless NIC. In the current codebase we assume to always
use the primary wed device in wed callbacks resulting in the following
crash if the hw runs wed_hif2 (e.g. 6GHz link).
[ 297.455876] Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 000000000000080a
[ 297.464928] Mem abort info:
[ 297.467722] ESR = 0x0000000096000005
[ 297.471461] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 297.476766] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 297.479809] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 297.482940] FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
[ 297.487809] Data abort info:
[ 297.490679] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 297.496156] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 297.501196] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 297.506500] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000107480000
[ 297.512927] [000000000000080a] pgd=08000001097fb003, p4d=08000001097fb003, pud=08000001097fb003, pmd=0000000000000000
[ 297.523532] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] SMP
[ 297.715393] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Tainted: G O 6.12.50 #0
[ 297.723908] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
[ 297.727384] Hardware name: Banana Pi BPI-R4 (2x SFP+) (DT)
[ 297.732857] Workqueue: nf_ft_offload_del nf_flow_rule_route_ipv6 [nf_flow_table]
[ 297.740254] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 297.747205] pc : mt76_wed_offload_disable+0x64/0xa0 [mt76]
[ 297.752688] lr : mtk_wed_flow_remove+0x58/0x80
[ 297.757126] sp : ffffffc080fe3ae0
[ 297.760430] x29: ffffffc080fe3ae0 x28: ffffffc080fe3be0 x27: 00000000deadbef7
[ 297.767557] x26: ffffff80c5ebca00 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: ffffff80c85f4c00
[ 297.774683] x23: ffffff80c1875b78 x22: ffffffc080d42cd0 x21: ffffffc080660018
[ 297.781809] x20: ffffff80c6a076d0 x19: ffffff80c6a043c8 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 297.788935] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000001 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 297.796060] x14: 0000000000000019 x13: ffffff80c0ad8ec0 x12: 00000000fa83b2da
[ 297.803185] x11: ffffff80c02700c0 x10: ffffff80c0ad8ec0 x9 : ffffff81fef96200
[ 297.810311] x8 : ffffff80c02700c0 x7 : ffffff80c02700d0 x6 : 0000000000000002
[ 297.817435] x5 : 0000000000000400 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 297.824561] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000000000800 x0 : ffffff80c6a063c8
[ 297.831686] Call trace:
[ 297.834123] mt76_wed_offload_disable+0x64/0xa0 [mt76]
[ 297.839254] mtk_wed_flow_remove+0x58/0x80
[ 297.843342] mtk_flow_offload_cmd+0x434/0x574
[ 297.847689] mtk_wed_setup_tc_block_cb+0x30/0x40
[ 297.852295] nf_flow_offload_ipv6_hook+0x7f4/0x964 [nf_flow_table]
[ 297.858466] nf_flow_rule_route_ipv6+0x438/0x4a4 [nf_flow_table]
[ 297.864463] process_one_work+0x174/0x300
[ 297.868465] worker_thread+0x278/0x430
[ 297.872204] kthread+0xd8/0xdc
[ 297.875251] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 297.878820] Code: 928b5ae0 8b000273 91400a60 f943fa61 (79401421)
[ 297.884901] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fix the issue detecting the proper wed reference to use running wed
callabacks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix double free of qgroup record after failure to add delayed ref head
In the previous code it was possible to incur into a double kfree()
scenario when calling add_delayed_ref_head(). This could happen if the
record was reported to already exist in the
btrfs_qgroup_trace_extent_nolock() call, but then there was an error
later on add_delayed_ref_head(). In this case, since
add_delayed_ref_head() returned an error, the caller went to free the
record. Since add_delayed_ref_head() couldn't set this kfree'd pointer
to NULL, then kfree() would have acted on a non-NULL 'record' object
which was pointing to memory already freed by the callee.
The problem comes from the fact that the responsibility to kfree the
object is on both the caller and the callee at the same time. Hence, the
fix for this is to shift the ownership of the 'qrecord' object out of
the add_delayed_ref_head(). That is, we will never attempt to kfree()
the given object inside of this function, and will expect the caller to
act on the 'qrecord' object on its own. The only exception where the
'qrecord' object cannot be kfree'd is if it was inserted into the
tracing logic, for which we already have the 'qrecord_inserted_ret'
boolean to account for this. Hence, the caller has to kfree the object
only if add_delayed_ref_head() reports not to have inserted it on the
tracing logic.
As a side-effect of the above, we must guarantee that
'qrecord_inserted_ret' is properly initialized at the start of the
function, not at the end, and then set when an actual insert
happens. This way we avoid 'qrecord_inserted_ret' having an invalid
value on an early exit.
The documentation from the add_delayed_ref_head() has also been updated
to reflect on the exact ownership of the 'qrecord' object. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Prevent recursive memory reclaim
Function new_inode() returns a new inode with inode->i_mapping->gfp_mask
set to GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE. This value includes the __GFP_FS flag, so
allocations in that address space can recurse into filesystem memory
reclaim. We don't want that to happen because it can consume a
significant amount of stack memory.
Worse than that is that it can also deadlock: for example, in several
places, gfs2_unstuff_dinode() is called inside filesystem transactions.
This calls filemap_grab_folio(), which can allocate a new folio, which
can trigger memory reclaim. If memory reclaim recurses into the
filesystem and starts another transaction, a deadlock will ensue.
To fix these kinds of problems, prevent memory reclaim from recursing
into filesystem code by making sure that the gfp_mask of inode address
spaces doesn't include __GFP_FS.
The "meta" and resource group address spaces were already using GFP_NOFS
as their gfp_mask (which doesn't include __GFP_FS). The default value
of GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE is less restrictive than GFP_NOFS, though. To
avoid being overly limiting, use the default value and only knock off
the __GFP_FS flag. I'm not sure if this will actually make a
difference, but it also shouldn't hurt.
This patch is loosely based on commit ad22c7a043c2 ("xfs: prevent stack
overflows from page cache allocation").
Fixes xfstest generic/273. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix exclusive map memory leak
When excl_prog_hash is 0 and excl_prog_hash_size is non-zero, the map also
needs to be freed. Otherwise, the map memory will not be reclaimed, just
like the memory leak problem reported by syzbot [1].
syzbot reported:
BUG: memory leak
backtrace (crc 7b9fb9b4):
map_create+0x322/0x11e0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1512
__sys_bpf+0x3556/0x3610 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6131 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: ch341: fix out-of-bounds memory access in ch341_transfer_one
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
The 'len' variable is calculated as 'min(32, trans->len + 1)',
which includes the 1-byte command header.
When copying data from 'trans->tx_buf' to 'ch341->tx_buf + 1', using 'len'
as the length is incorrect because:
1. It causes an out-of-bounds read from 'trans->tx_buf' (which has size
'trans->len', i.e., 'len - 1' in this context).
2. It can cause an out-of-bounds write to 'ch341->tx_buf' if 'len' is
CH341_PACKET_LENGTH (32). Writing 32 bytes to ch341->tx_buf + 1
overflows the buffer.
Fix this by copying 'len - 1' bytes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: fix divide-by-zero in exfat_allocate_bitmap
The variable max_ra_count can be 0 in exfat_allocate_bitmap(),
which causes a divide-by-zero error in the subsequent modulo operation
(i % max_ra_count), leading to a system crash.
When max_ra_count is 0, it means that readahead is not used. This patch
load the bitmap without readahead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: fix memory leak in __blkdev_issue_zero_pages
Move the fatal signal check before bio_alloc() to prevent a memory
leak when BLKDEV_ZERO_KILLABLE is set and a fatal signal is pending.
Previously, the bio was allocated before checking for a fatal signal.
If a signal was pending, the code would break out of the loop without
freeing or chaining the just-allocated bio, causing a memory leak.
This matches the pattern already used in __blkdev_issue_write_zeroes()
where the signal check precedes the allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix memory leaks in ext4_fname_{setup_filename,prepare_lookup}
If the filename casefolding fails, we'll be leaking memory from the
fscrypt_name struct, namely from the 'crypto_buf.name' member.
Make sure we free it in the error path on both ext4_fname_setup_filename()
and ext4_fname_prepare_lookup() functions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-mq: avoid double ->queue_rq() because of early timeout
David Jeffery found one double ->queue_rq() issue, so far it can
be triggered in VM use case because of long vmexit latency or preempt
latency of vCPU pthread or long page fault in vCPU pthread, then block
IO req could be timed out before queuing the request to hardware but after
calling blk_mq_start_request() during ->queue_rq(), then timeout handler
may handle it by requeue, then double ->queue_rq() is caused, and kernel
panic.
So far, it is driver's responsibility to cover the race between timeout
and completion, so it seems supposed to be solved in driver in theory,
given driver has enough knowledge.
But it is really one common problem, lots of driver could have similar
issue, and could be hard to fix all affected drivers, even it isn't easy
for driver to handle the race. So David suggests this patch by draining
in-progress ->queue_rq() for solving this issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix a null-ptr-deref in tipc_topsrv_accept
syzbot found a crash in tipc_topsrv_accept:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
Workqueue: tipc_rcv tipc_topsrv_accept
RIP: 0010:kernel_accept+0x22d/0x350 net/socket.c:3487
Call Trace:
<TASK>
tipc_topsrv_accept+0x197/0x280 net/tipc/topsrv.c:460
process_one_work+0x991/0x1610 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306
It was caused by srv->listener that might be set to null by
tipc_topsrv_stop() in net .exit whereas it's still used in
tipc_topsrv_accept() worker.
srv->listener is protected by srv->idr_lock in tipc_topsrv_stop(), so add
a check for srv->listener under srv->idr_lock in tipc_topsrv_accept() to
avoid the null-ptr-deref. To ensure the lsock is not released during the
tipc_topsrv_accept(), move sock_release() after tipc_topsrv_work_stop()
where it's waiting until the tipc_topsrv_accept worker to be done.
Note that sk_callback_lock is used to protect sk->sk_user_data instead of
srv->listener, and it should check srv in tipc_topsrv_listener_data_ready()
instead. This also ensures that no more tipc_topsrv_accept worker will be
started after tipc_conn_close() is called in tipc_topsrv_stop() where it
sets sk->sk_user_data to null. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
soc: aspeed: socinfo: Add kfree for kstrdup
Add kfree() in the later error handling in order to avoid memory leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: reject invalid reloc tree root keys with stack dump
[BUG]
Syzbot reported a crash that an ASSERT() got triggered inside
prepare_to_merge().
That ASSERT() makes sure the reloc tree is properly pointed back by its
subvolume tree.
[CAUSE]
After more debugging output, it turns out we had an invalid reloc tree:
BTRFS error (device loop1): reloc tree mismatch, root 8 has no reloc root, expect reloc root key (-8, 132, 8) gen 17
Note the above root key is (TREE_RELOC_OBJECTID, ROOT_ITEM,
QUOTA_TREE_OBJECTID), meaning it's a reloc tree for quota tree.
But reloc trees can only exist for subvolumes, as for non-subvolume
trees, we just COW the involved tree block, no need to create a reloc
tree since those tree blocks won't be shared with other trees.
Only subvolumes tree can share tree blocks with other trees (thus they
have BTRFS_ROOT_SHAREABLE flag).
Thus this new debug output proves my previous assumption that corrupted
on-disk data can trigger that ASSERT().
[FIX]
Besides the dedicated fix and the graceful exit, also let tree-checker to
check such root keys, to make sure reloc trees can only exist for subvolumes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: Avoid nf_ct_helper_hash uses after free
If nf_conntrack_init_start() fails (for example due to a
register_nf_conntrack_bpf() failure), the nf_conntrack_helper_fini()
clean-up path frees the nf_ct_helper_hash map.
When built with NF_CONNTRACK=y, further netfilter modules (e.g:
netfilter_conntrack_ftp) can still be loaded and call
nf_conntrack_helpers_register(), independently of whether nf_conntrack
initialized correctly. This accesses the nf_ct_helper_hash dangling
pointer and causes a uaf, possibly leading to random memory corruption.
This patch guards nf_conntrack_helper_register() from accessing a freed
or uninitialized nf_ct_helper_hash pointer and fixes possible
uses-after-free when loading a conntrack module. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: fix soft lockup in status_resync
status_resync() will calculate 'curr_resync - recovery_active' to show
user a progress bar like following:
[============>........] resync = 61.4%
'curr_resync' and 'recovery_active' is updated in md_do_sync(), and
status_resync() can read them concurrently, hence it's possible that
'curr_resync - recovery_active' can overflow to a huge number. In this
case status_resync() will be stuck in the loop to print a large amount
of '=', which will end up soft lockup.
Fix the problem by setting 'resync' to MD_RESYNC_ACTIVE in this case,
this way resync in progress will be reported to user. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memcontrol: ensure memcg acquired by id is properly set up
In the eviction recency check, we attempt to retrieve the memcg to which
the folio belonged when it was evicted, by the memcg id stored in the
shadow entry. However, there is a chance that the retrieved memcg is not
the original memcg that has been killed, but a new one which happens to
have the same id.
This is a somewhat unfortunate, but acceptable and rare inaccuracy in the
heuristics. However, if we retrieve this new memcg between its allocation
and when it is properly attached to the memcg hierarchy, we could run into
the following NULL pointer exception during the memcg hierarchy traversal
done in mem_cgroup_get_nr_swap_pages():
[ 155757.793456] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000c0
[ 155757.807568] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 155757.818024] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 155757.828482] PGD 401f77067 P4D 401f77067 PUD 401f76067 PMD 0
[ 155757.839985] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 155757.887870] RIP: 0010:mem_cgroup_get_nr_swap_pages+0x3d/0xb0
[ 155757.899377] Code: 29 19 4a 02 48 39 f9 74 63 48 8b 97 c0 00 00 00 48 8b b7 58 02 00 00 48 2b b7 c0 01 00 00 48 39 f0 48 0f 4d c6 48 39 d1 74 42 <48> 8b b2 c0 00 00 00 48 8b ba 58 02 00 00 48 2b ba c0 01 00 00 48
[ 155757.937125] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002ecdfbc8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 155757.947755] RAX: 00000000003a3b1c RBX: 000007ffffffffff RCX: ffff888280183000
[ 155757.962202] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0007ffffffffffff RDI: ffff888bbc2d1000
[ 155757.976648] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 000000000000000b R09: ffff888ad9cedba0
[ 155757.991094] R10: ffffea0039c07900 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: ffff888b23a7b000
[ 155758.005540] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888bbc2d1000 R15: 000007ffffc71354
[ 155758.019991] FS: 00007f6234c68640(0000) GS:ffff88903f9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 155758.036356] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 155758.048023] CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000000a83eb8004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[ 155758.062473] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 155758.076924] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 155758.091376] PKRU: 55555554
[ 155758.096957] Call Trace:
[ 155758.102016] <TASK>
[ 155758.106502] ? __die+0x78/0xc0
[ 155758.112793] ? page_fault_oops+0x286/0x380
[ 155758.121175] ? exc_page_fault+0x5d/0x110
[ 155758.129209] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 155758.137763] ? mem_cgroup_get_nr_swap_pages+0x3d/0xb0
[ 155758.148060] workingset_test_recent+0xda/0x1b0
[ 155758.157133] workingset_refault+0xca/0x1e0
[ 155758.165508] filemap_add_folio+0x4d/0x70
[ 155758.173538] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0xed/0x190
[ 155758.182919] page_cache_sync_ra+0xd6/0x1e0
[ 155758.191738] filemap_read+0x68d/0xdf0
[ 155758.199495] ? mlx5e_napi_poll+0x123/0x940
[ 155758.207981] ? __napi_schedule+0x55/0x90
[ 155758.216095] __x64_sys_pread64+0x1d6/0x2c0
[ 155758.224601] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
[ 155758.232058] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
[ 155758.242473] RIP: 0033:0x7f62c29153b5
[ 155758.249938] Code: e8 48 89 75 f0 89 7d f8 48 89 4d e0 e8 b4 e6 f7 ff 41 89 c0 4c 8b 55 e0 48 8b 55 e8 48 8b 75 f0 8b 7d f8 b8 11 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 33 44 89 c7 48 89 45 f8 e8 e7 e6 f7 ff 48 8b
[ 155758.288005] RSP: 002b:00007f6234c5ffd0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000011
[ 155758.303474] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f628c4e70c0 RCX: 00007f62c29153b5
[ 155758.318075] RDX: 000000000003c041 RSI: 00007f61d2986000 RDI: 0000000000000076
[ 155758.332678] RBP: 00007f6234c5fff0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000064d5230c
[ 155758.347452] R10: 000000000027d450 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 000000000003c041
[ 155758.362044] R13: 00007f61d2986000 R14: 00007f629e11b060 R15: 000000000027d450
[ 155758.376661] </TASK>
This patch fixes the issue by moving the memcg's id publication from the
alloc stage to
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Fix possible data races in gfs2_show_options()
Some fields such as gt_logd_secs of the struct gfs2_tune are accessed
without holding the lock gt_spin in gfs2_show_options():
val = sdp->sd_tune.gt_logd_secs;
if (val != 30)
seq_printf(s, ",commit=%d", val);
And thus can cause data races when gfs2_show_options() and other functions
such as gfs2_reconfigure() are concurrently executed:
spin_lock(>->gt_spin);
gt->gt_logd_secs = newargs->ar_commit;
To fix these possible data races, the lock sdp->sd_tune.gt_spin is
acquired before accessing the fields of gfs2_tune and released after these
accesses.
Further changes by Andreas:
- Don't hold the spin lock over the seq_printf operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/swap: fix swap_info_struct race between swapoff and get_swap_pages()
The si->lock must be held when deleting the si from the available list.
Otherwise, another thread can re-add the si to the available list, which
can lead to memory corruption. The only place we have found where this
happens is in the swapoff path. This case can be described as below:
core 0 core 1
swapoff
del_from_avail_list(si) waiting
try lock si->lock acquire swap_avail_lock
and re-add si into
swap_avail_head
acquire si->lock but missing si already being added again, and continuing
to clear SWP_WRITEOK, etc.
It can be easily found that a massive warning messages can be triggered
inside get_swap_pages() by some special cases, for example, we call
madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) on blocks of touched memory concurrently, meanwhile,
run much swapon-swapoff operations (e.g. stress-ng-swap).
However, in the worst case, panic can be caused by the above scene. In
swapoff(), the memory used by si could be kept in swap_info[] after
turning off a swap. This means memory corruption will not be caused
immediately until allocated and reset for a new swap in the swapon path.
A panic message caused: (with CONFIG_PLIST_DEBUG enabled)
------------[ cut here ]------------
top: 00000000e58a3003, n: 0000000013e75cda, p: 000000008cd4451a
prev: 0000000035b1e58a, n: 000000008cd4451a, p: 000000002150ee8d
next: 000000008cd4451a, n: 000000008cd4451a, p: 000000008cd4451a
WARNING: CPU: 21 PID: 1843 at lib/plist.c:60 plist_check_prev_next_node+0x50/0x70
Modules linked in: rfkill(E) crct10dif_ce(E)...
CPU: 21 PID: 1843 Comm: stress-ng Kdump: ... 5.10.134+
Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
pc : plist_check_prev_next_node+0x50/0x70
lr : plist_check_prev_next_node+0x50/0x70
sp : ffff0018009d3c30
x29: ffff0018009d3c40 x28: ffff800011b32a98
x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff001803908000
x25: ffff8000128ea088 x24: ffff800011b32a48
x23: 0000000000000028 x22: ffff001800875c00
x21: ffff800010f9e520 x20: ffff001800875c00
x19: ffff001800fdc6e0 x18: 0000000000000030
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
x15: 0736076307640766 x14: 0730073007380731
x13: 0736076307640766 x12: 0730073007380731
x11: 000000000004058d x10: 0000000085a85b76
x9 : ffff8000101436e4 x8 : ffff800011c8ce08
x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff0017df9ed338 x4 : 0000000000000001
x3 : ffff8017ce62a000 x2 : ffff0017df9ed340
x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
plist_check_prev_next_node+0x50/0x70
plist_check_head+0x80/0xf0
plist_add+0x28/0x140
add_to_avail_list+0x9c/0xf0
_enable_swap_info+0x78/0xb4
__do_sys_swapon+0x918/0xa10
__arm64_sys_swapon+0x20/0x30
el0_svc_common+0x8c/0x220
do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x90
el0_svc+0x1c/0x30
el0_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0
el0_sync+0x148/0x180
irq event stamp: 2082270
Now, si->lock locked before calling 'del_from_avail_list()' to make sure
other thread see the si had been deleted and SWP_WRITEOK cleared together,
will not reinsert again.
This problem exists in versions after stable 5.10.y. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_fq: fix integer overflow of "credit"
if sch_fq is configured with "initial quantum" having values greater than
INT_MAX, the first assignment of "credit" does signed integer overflow to
a very negative value.
In this situation, the syzkaller script provided by Cristoph triggers the
CPU soft-lockup warning even with few sockets. It's not an infinite loop,
but "credit" wasn't probably meant to be minus 2Gb for each new flow.
Capping "initial quantum" to INT_MAX proved to fix the issue.
v2: validation of "initial quantum" is done in fq_policy, instead of open
coding in fq_change() _ suggested by Jakub Kicinski |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gvt: fix vgpu debugfs clean in remove
Check carefully on root debugfs available when destroying vgpu,
e.g in remove case drm minor's debugfs root might already be destroyed,
which led to kernel oops like below.
Console: switching to colour dummy device 80x25
i915 0000:00:02.0: MDEV: Unregistering
intel_vgpu_mdev b1338b2d-a709-4c23-b766-cc436c36cdf0: Removing from iommu group 14
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000150
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 3 PID: 1046 Comm: driverctl Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2+ #6
Hardware name: HP HP ProDesk 600 G3 MT/829D, BIOS P02 Ver. 02.44 09/13/2022
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x5e2/0x1f90
Code: 87 ad 09 00 00 39 05 e1 1e cc 02 0f 82 f1 09 00 00 ba 01 00 00 00 48 83 c4 48 89 d0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 45 31 ff <48> 81 3f 60 9e c2 b6 45 0f 45 f8 83 fe 01 0f 87 55 fa ff ff 89 f0
RSP: 0018:ffff9f770274f948 EFLAGS: 00010046
RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000150
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8895d1173300 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000150 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fc9b2ba0740(0000) GS:ffff889cdfcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000150 CR3: 000000010fd93005 CR4: 00000000003706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
lock_acquire+0xbf/0x2b0
? simple_recursive_removal+0xa5/0x2b0
? lock_release+0x13d/0x2d0
down_write+0x2a/0xd0
? simple_recursive_removal+0xa5/0x2b0
simple_recursive_removal+0xa5/0x2b0
? start_creating.part.0+0x110/0x110
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40
debugfs_remove+0x40/0x60
intel_gvt_debugfs_remove_vgpu+0x15/0x30 [kvmgt]
intel_gvt_destroy_vgpu+0x60/0x100 [kvmgt]
intel_vgpu_release_dev+0xe/0x20 [kvmgt]
device_release+0x30/0x80
kobject_put+0x79/0x1b0
device_release_driver_internal+0x1b8/0x230
bus_remove_device+0xec/0x160
device_del+0x189/0x400
? up_write+0x9c/0x1b0
? mdev_device_remove_common+0x60/0x60 [mdev]
mdev_device_remove_common+0x22/0x60 [mdev]
mdev_device_remove_cb+0x17/0x20 [mdev]
device_for_each_child+0x56/0x80
mdev_unregister_parent+0x5a/0x81 [mdev]
intel_gvt_clean_device+0x2d/0xe0 [kvmgt]
intel_gvt_driver_remove+0x2e/0xb0 [i915]
i915_driver_remove+0xac/0x100 [i915]
i915_pci_remove+0x1a/0x30 [i915]
pci_device_remove+0x31/0xa0
device_release_driver_internal+0x1b8/0x230
unbind_store+0xd8/0x100
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x156/0x210
vfs_write+0x236/0x4a0
ksys_write+0x61/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x55/0x80
? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
? lock_release+0x13d/0x2d0
? up_read+0x17/0x20
? lock_is_held_type+0xe3/0x140
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7fc9b2c9e0c4
Code: 15 71 7d 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 3d 05 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffec29c81c8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000000d RCX: 00007fc9b2c9e0c4
RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 0000559f8b5f48a0 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000559f8b5f48a0 R08: 0000559f8b5f3540 R09: 00007fc9b2d76d30
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000000000000000d
R13: 00007fc9b2d77780 R14: 000000000000000d R15: 00007fc9b2d72a00
</TASK>
Modules linked in: sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_pmc_core_pltdrv intel_pmc_core intel_tcc_cooling x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel ee1004 igbvf rapl vfat fat intel_cstate intel_uncore pktcdvd i2c_i801 pcspkr wmi_bmof i2c_smbus acpi_pad vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd zram fuse dm
---truncated--- |
