In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length
mesh_send() currently bounds MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND by total command
length, but it never verifies that the bytes supplied for the
flexible adv_data[] array actually match the embedded adv_data_len
field. MGMT_MESH_SEND_SIZE only covers the fixed header, so a
truncated command can still pass the existing 20..50 byte range
check and later drive the async mesh send path past the end of the
queued command buffer.
Keep rejecting zero-length and oversized advertising payloads, but
validate adv_data_len explicitly and require the command length to
exactly match the flexible array size before queueing the request.
Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length
mesh_send() currently bounds MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND by total command
length, but it never verifies that the bytes supplied for the
flexible adv_data[] array actually match the embedded adv_data_len
field. MGMT_MESH_SEND_SIZE only covers the fixed header, so a
truncated command can still pass the existing 20..50 byte range
check and later drive the async mesh send path past the end of the
queued command buffer.
Keep rejecting zero-length and oversized advertising payloads, but
validate adv_data_len explicitly and require the command length to
exactly match the flexible array size before queueing the request.
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Debian DSA |
DSA-6243-1 | linux security update |
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Sat, 02 May 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-130 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Fri, 01 May 2026 14:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length mesh_send() currently bounds MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND by total command length, but it never verifies that the bytes supplied for the flexible adv_data[] array actually match the embedded adv_data_len field. MGMT_MESH_SEND_SIZE only covers the fixed header, so a truncated command can still pass the existing 20..50 byte range check and later drive the async mesh send path past the end of the queued command buffer. Keep rejecting zero-length and oversized advertising payloads, but validate adv_data_len explicitly and require the command length to exactly match the flexible array size before queueing the request. | |
| Title | Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-01T14:15:21.561Z
Reserved: 2026-05-01T14:12:55.975Z
Link: CVE-2026-43017
No data.
Status : Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2026-05-01T15:16:45.837
Modified: 2026-05-01T15:24:14.893
Link: CVE-2026-43017
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-01T20:15:24Z
Weaknesses
No weakness.
Debian DSA