Anchor is a framework providing several convenient developer tools for writing Solana programs. From 1.0.0 to before 1.0.2, an logic error causes anchor programs to accept any program id when requiring the system program id, causing false assumptions resulting in potential arbitrary cpi in programs that invoke system program instructions. In the TryFrom<&'a AccountInfo<'a>> implementation for Program<'a, T>, the id of T is compared with Pubkey::default() to check whether anchor should allow any executable account, or a specific account, because when no T is supplied, T defaults to (), which implements Id::id() by returning Pubkey::default(). This results in T = () and T = System (which has Pubkey::default() as the id) having the same behavior, both allow any executable account. Programs built with anchor assume that the anchor runtime verifies passed in programs of type Program<'a, System> are in fact the system program. This false assumption can lead to arbitrary CPI or payment bypassing when programs try making CPI calls to the system program using the passed in system program due to the fact that the attacker can pass in any program instead of the system program. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.2.

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Advisories
Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-c6rc-8jpp-2fgc Anchor: Program<'info, System> is not properly validated
Fixes

Solution

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Workaround

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History

Wed, 27 May 2026 21:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Anchor is a framework providing several convenient developer tools for writing Solana programs. From 1.0.0 to before 1.0.2, an logic error causes anchor programs to accept any program id when requiring the system program id, causing false assumptions resulting in potential arbitrary cpi in programs that invoke system program instructions. In the TryFrom<&'a AccountInfo<'a>> implementation for Program<'a, T>, the id of T is compared with Pubkey::default() to check whether anchor should allow any executable account, or a specific account, because when no T is supplied, T defaults to (), which implements Id::id() by returning Pubkey::default(). This results in T = () and T = System (which has Pubkey::default() as the id) having the same behavior, both allow any executable account. Programs built with anchor assume that the anchor runtime verifies passed in programs of type Program<'a, System> are in fact the system program. This false assumption can lead to arbitrary CPI or payment bypassing when programs try making CPI calls to the system program using the passed in system program due to the fact that the attacker can pass in any program instead of the system program. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.2.
Title Anchor: Program<'info, System> is not properly validated
Weaknesses CWE-20
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N'}


Projects

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-05-27T20:52:23.381Z

Reserved: 2026-05-08T20:08:17.210Z

Link: CVE-2026-45137

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-05-27T21:16:18.670

Modified: 2026-05-27T21:16:18.670

Link: CVE-2026-45137

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-05-27T22:30:35Z

Weaknesses