scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show()
target_tg_pt_gp_members_show() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a
256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() cur_len bytes from that
buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which
can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN
names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only
guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will
read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs
reader, which when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic()
will be triggered.
Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: target_core_configfs: Add length
check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the
target_lu_gp_members_show() but the tg_pt_gp variant was missed so
resolve that here.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | unaffected |
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| Linux | Linux | affected |
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Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
Thu, 28 May 2026 12:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-119 |
Thu, 28 May 2026 10:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show() target_tg_pt_gp_members_show() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a 256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() cur_len bytes from that buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs reader, which when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic() will be triggered. Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: target_core_configfs: Add length check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the target_lu_gp_members_show() but the tg_pt_gp variant was missed so resolve that here. | |
| Title | scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show() | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Projects
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-28T09:36:05.706Z
Reserved: 2026-05-13T15:03:33.101Z
Link: CVE-2026-46149
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
Status : Received
Published: 2026-05-28T10:16:30.513
Modified: 2026-05-28T10:16:30.513
Link: CVE-2026-46149
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-28T11:45:16Z