| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in FFmpeg’s ALS audio decoder, where it does not properly check for memory allocation failures. This can cause the application to crash when processing certain malformed audio files. While it does not lead to data theft or system control, it can be used to disrupt services and cause a denial of service. |
| An improper resource deallocation and closure vulnerability in the tools/zmqsend.c component of FFmpeg v8.0.1 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted input file. |
| A heap buffer overflow in the av_bprint_finalize() function of FFmpeg v8.0.1 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted input. |
| FFmpeg 0.4.9, as used by MPlayer, allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via unknown vectors, aka a "Tcp/udp memory leak." |
| Integer signedness error in the fourxm_read_header function in libavformat/4xm.c in FFmpeg before revision 16846 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a malformed 4X movie file with a large current_track value, which triggers a NULL pointer dereference. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in the str_read_packet function in libavformat/psxstr.c in FFmpeg before r13993 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or execute arbitrary code via a crafted STR file that interleaves audio and video sectors. |
| Multiple buffer overflows in libavformat/utils.c in FFmpeg 0.4.9 before r14715, as used by MPlayer, allow context-dependent attackers to have an unknown impact via vectors related to execution of DTS generation code with a delay greater than MAX_REORDER_DELAY. |
| The ffmpeg lavf demuxer allows user-assisted attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted GIF file, possibly related to gstreamer, as demonstrated by lol-giftopnm.gif. |
| Buffer overflow in libavcodec/dca.c in FFmpeg 0.4.9 before r14917, as used by MPlayer, allows context-dependent attackers to have an unknown impact via vectors related to an incorrect DCA_MAX_FRAME_SIZE value. |
| Unspecified vulnerability in the avcodec_close function in libavcodec/utils.c in FFmpeg 0.4.9 before r14787, as used by MPlayer, has unknown impact and attack vectors, related to a free "on random pointers." |
| FFmpeg before 8.1 has an integer overflow and resultant out-of-bounds write via CENC (Common Encryption) subsample data to libavformat/mov.c. |
| An out-of-bounds read in the read_global_param() function (libavcodec/av1dec.c) of FFmpeg v8.0.1 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via a crafted input. |
| A flaw was found in FFmpeg. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by providing a specially crafted MPEG-PS/VOB media file containing a malicious DVD subtitle stream. This vulnerability is caused by a signed integer overflow in the DVD subtitle parser's fragment reassembly bounds checks, leading to a heap out-of-bounds write. Successful exploitation can result in a denial of service (DoS) due to an application crash, and potentially lead to arbitrary code execution. |
| When decoding a frame for a SANM file (ANIM v0 variant), the decoded data can be larger than the buffer allocated for it.
Frames encoded with codec 48 can specify their resolution (width x height). A buffer of appropriate size is allocated depending on the resolution.
This codec can encode the frame contents using a run-length encoding algorithm. There are no checks that the decoded frame fits in the allocated buffer, leading to a heap-buffer-overflow.
process_frame_obj initializes the buffers based on the frame resolution:
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When calculating the content path in handling of MPEG-DASH manifests, there's an out-of-bounds NUL-byte write one byte past the end of the buffer.When we call xmlNodeGetContent below [0], it returns a buffer precisely allocated to match the string length, using strdup internally. If this buffer is not an empty string, it is assigned to root_url at [1].If the last (non-NUL) byte in this buffer is not '/' then we append '/' in-place at [2]. This will write two bytes into the buffer, starting at the last valid byte in the buffer, writing the NUL byte beyond the end of the allocated buffer.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, the specified raw length of run-length-encoded data is not checked when using it to calculate the output data.
We read rle_raw_size from the input file at [0], we decompress and decode into the buffer td->rle_raw_data of size rle_raw_size at [1], and then at [2] we will access entries in this buffer up to (td->xsize - 1) * (td->ysize - 1) + rle_raw_size / 2, which may exceed rle_raw_size.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that the height and width are divisible by 8.
If the height or width of the image is not divisible by 8, the copy loops at [0] and [1] will continue to write until the next multiple of 8.
The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the precise height and width of the image, so the "rounded-up" multiple of 8 in the copy loop can exceed the buffer bounds, and the write block starting at [2] can corrupt following heap memory.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| A reachable assertion in FFmpeg git-master commit N-113007-g8d24a28d06 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via opening a crafted AAC file. |
| When parsing the header for a DHAV file, there's an integer underflow in offset calculation that leads to reading the duration from before the start of the allocated buffer.
If we load a DHAV file that is larger than MAX_DURATION_BUFFER_SIZE bytes (0x100000) for example 0x101000 bytes, then at [0] we have size = 0x101000. At [1] we have end_buffer_size = 0x100000, and at [2] we have end_buffer_pos = 0x1000.
The loop then scans backwards through the buffer looking for the dhav tag; when it is found, we'll calculate end_pos based on a 32-bit offset read from the buffer.
There is subsequently a check [3] that end_pos is within the section of the file that has been copied into end_buffer, but it only correctly handles the cases where end_pos is before the start of the file or after the section copied into end_buffer, and not the case where end_pos is within the the file, but before the section copied into end_buffer. If we provide such an offset, (end_pos - end_buffer_pos) can underflow, resulting in the subsequent access at [4] occurring before the beginning of the allocation.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
| When decoding an OpenEXR file that uses DWAA or DWAB compression, there's an implicit assumption that all image channels have the same pixel type (and size), and that if there are four channels, the first four are "B", "G", "R" and "A". The channel parsing code can be found in decode_header. The buffer td->uncompressed_data is allocated in decode_block based on the xsize, ysize and computed current_channel_offset.
The function dwa_uncompress then assumes at [5] that if there are 4 channels, these are "B", "G", "R" and "A", and in the calculations at [6] and [7] that all channels are of the same type, which matches the type of the main color channels.
If we set the main color channels to a 4-byte type and add duplicate or unknown channels of the 2-byte EXR_HALF type, then the addition at [7] will increment the pointer by 4-bytes * xsize * nb_channels, which will exceed the allocated buffer.
We recommend upgrading to version 8.0 or beyond. |
